concluding in a products liability case involving administration of a drug alleged to cause birth defects that "the requirement of a more than 50% probability means that epidemiological evidence must show [at least] that the risk of an injury or condition in the exposed population was more than double the risk in the unexposed or control population,” citing numerous decisions and Judge Weinstein's seminal decision in In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1223, 1262 (E.D.N.Y.1985), in which he held that the plaintiffs were required to offer evidence that causation was " ‘more than 50 percent probable' ”
How later courts described this case
- concluding in a products liability case involving administration of a drug alleged to cause birth defects that "the requirement of a more than 50% probability means that epidemiological evidence must show [at least] that the risk of an injury or condition in the exposed population was more than double the risk in the unexposed or control population,” citing numerous decisions and Judge Weinstein's seminal decision in In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F.Supp. 1223, 1262 (E.D.N.Y.1985), in which he held that the plaintiffs were required to offer evidence that causation was " ‘more than 50 percent probable' ”
- holding that legal sufficiency challenge “will be sustained when (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a scintilla, or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.”
- concluding that properly designed and executed epidemiological studies may be part of the evidence supporting causation in a toxic tort case, and finding a rational basis for relating the requirement that there be more than a "doubling of the risk" to the "more likely than not" burden of proof
- holding “[m]ore than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence supporting the finding, as a whole, rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions” (internal quotations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SPECTOR, Justice,
concurring.
The Court today fails to heed its own warning that “the examination of a scientific study by a cadre of lawyers is not the same as its examination by others trained in the field of science or medicine.” 953 S.W.2d at 727 (internal citations omitted). I agree that the Havners’ expert witness testimony is not legally sufficient evidence of causation. However, as a judge, and not a scientist, I am uncomfortable with the majority’s ambitious scientific analysis and its unnecessarily expansive application of the Daubert standard. The majority’s opinion, replete with dicta, gives courts no practical guidance outside the context of Bendectin litigation. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment of the Court.