holding that jurisdiction lay in the court of common pleas “notwithstanding the injunctive/declaratory label attached to [c]ount I of the complaint, reasoning that “permitting jurisdictional questions to turn solely upon the styling of claims within a complaint would arguably permit forum shopping through pleading” and that courts “have traditionally looked to the substance rather than the form of the complaint to determine matters of jurisdiction”
How later courts described this case
- holding that jurisdiction lay in the court of common pleas “notwithstanding the injunctive/declaratory label attached to [c]ount I of the complaint, reasoning that “permitting jurisdictional questions to turn solely upon the styling of claims within a complaint would arguably permit forum shopping through pleading” and that courts “have traditionally looked to the substance rather than the form of the complaint to determine matters of jurisdiction”
- stating that the plaintiff’s assertions of invasion of privacy, defamation, and infliction of emotional distress “are tort claims in the nature of trespass within the meaning of Section 761(a)(1)(v)”
- concluding that monetary compensation sought for alleged improper invasion of privacy and reputational interests deprived the Commonwealth Court of jurisdiction
- affirming this Court’s order transferring the case to the court of common pleas because the nature of the action was a tort action as provided by Section 761(a)(1)(v) seeking money damages to compensate the petitioner for injury done to her privacy and reputational interests and, therefore, was the type of action as to which the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed sovereign immunity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*566 Justice NEWMAN
concurring.
I join the majority opinion but write separately to reflect my view that this Court need not recharacterize the nature of Appellant’s complaint in Count I, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as a compensatory claim to determine that the claim does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court.
In the instant matter, the Commonwealth argues that, according to statute, the Commonwealth Court has ancillary jurisdiction over any claim or other matter that is related to a claim or other matter otherwise within its exclusive original jurisdiction. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(c). Superficially, this is an appealing argument, but it is flawed.
Section 761 of the Judicial Code, subsection (c), provides in relevant part as follows:
To the extent prescribed by general rule the Commonwealth Court shall have ancillary jurisdiction over any claim or other matter which is related to a claim or other matter otherwise within its exclusive jurisdiction.
42 Pa.C.S. § 761(c).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ancillary jurisdiction” as the “[pjower of [a] court to adjudicate and determine matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction of an action.” Black’s Law Dictionary 86 (6th ed. 1990). However, the statute does not provide the Commonwealth Court with unfettered jurisdiction over all “matters incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction....” Id. Rather, subsection (c) refers back to the general rule granting the Commonwealth Court original jurisdiction. That general rule, codified at subsection (a) of Section 761, provides:
(a) General Rule. — The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:
(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, except:
*567 (v) actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass as to which the Commonwealth government formerly enjoyed sovereign or other immunity and actions or proceedings in the nature of assumpsit relating to such actions or proceedings in the nature of trespass.
42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a) (internal footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
The plain language of Section 761, when read in its entirety, provides that ancillary jurisdiction is in the Commonwealth Court only where the following two prerequisites are satisfied: (1) the ancillary claim is related to a claim within the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court; and (2) the ancillary claim is not otherwise removed from the original jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court through operation of the General Rule codified in subsection (a). 1 In the case subjudice, there is no dispute that the claim of Appellant for money damages falls -within an exception to the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction. As the General Assembly has expressly removed this variety of claim from the possible cognizance of the Commonwealth Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, ancillary jurisdiction over this matter cannot lie.
There is further support in our case law. In School Dist. of Borough of Irwin v. School Dist. of North Huntingdon Twp., 374 Pa. 134 , 97 A.2d 96 (1953), this Court reviewed ancillary jurisdiction within the context of the jurisdiction of a court of quarter sessions. In Irwin, the Borough of Irwin annexed land that included portions of the North Huntingdon Township School District. The Township challenged the annexation statute and the issue concerning whether one of the school districts owed tuition to the other for the students attending the wrong school was ancillary to the matter to be decided. The Borough issued a notice that students in this area should register in the Irwin School District for the upcoming year. The Township issued a notice that advised students to continue attending the Township School District. Sixty-seven stu *568 dents residing in the Township registered for the Borough schools.
The Westmoreland County Court of Common Pleas determined that the students should continue in the schools in which they were then enrolled and that tuition was to be paid by the school district of their residence. On appeal, this Court held that the Court of Common Pleas had no jurisdiction to consider the ancillary matter of student attendance and tuition. Even though the Borough maintained that, because the court had jurisdiction of the complaint attacking the ordinance, it also had the “power to determine all other issues incidental to the case and reasonably necessary for the administration of justice,” Irwin, 97 A.2d at 99, this Court disagreed and stated:
Ordinarily that is so, but it is subject to the important qualification that the ‘other issues’ cognizable by the court must fall within its general jurisdiction .... ‘[Courts] may do all things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction.’
Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, it is unnecessary to recharacterize Count I because matters ancillary to the primary cause of action must fall within the scope of the general jurisdiction of the court, as defined by the general rule, before the court acquires jurisdiction to hear those ancillary matters. By law, the entire matter must be adjudicated in the court of common pleas.
. I note that, pursuant to 1 Pa.C.S. § 1924, the title of a subsection of a statute "shall not be considered to control but may be used to aid in the construction thereof.”