The opinion
On Motion for Rehearing
Both parties have moved for rehearing. Both parties have either misinterpreted or misunderstood the holding of this Court. We attempted to make a distinction between the words intentionally, willfully and wantonly. We did not think it necessary to discuss willful or intentional because we did not think the appellants willfully or intentionally injured the appellees. There is little distinction between willful and intentional, as Webster defines willful as self-determined or desirous and intentional as pertaining to intention or design. We do not think appellants willfully or intentionally injured the appellees. Webster defines wanton as marked by or manifesting arrogant recklessness of justice of the rights of others. We then quoted Judge Critz in the case of Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Evans, 142 Tex. 1 , 175 S.W.2d 249, 251 , where he stated, “Negligence rests primarily upon two elements: (a) reason to anticipate injury, and (b) failure to perform the *621 duty arising on account of that anticipation.” We thereby held the appellants could anticipate injury and owed the duty to ap-pellees not to negligently injure such estate. After carefully considering both motions for rehearing they are both accordingly overruled.