stating that the trial court did not err in denying challenges for cause to venire members who expressed interest in the possibility of parole but also stated that they could follow trial court’s instructions not to consider the possibility of early release in answering the special issues
How later courts described this case
- stating that the trial court did not err in denying challenges for cause to venire members who expressed interest in the possibility of parole but also stated that they could follow trial court’s instructions not to consider the possibility of early release in answering the special issues
- holding evidence that drawing found in appellant's cell sufficient connection to render drawing relevant and permit state to make argument it was appellant's drawing
- holding that drawing of defendant holding bloody knife found in defendant’s cell was sufficient connection to render the drawing relevant to sentencing
- explaining that United States Supreme Court has not yet mandated that jurors must give weight to any particular type of evidence offered in mitigation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting.
This ease has a checkered history that must be recounted in order to put this dissent into proper perspective. Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. The trial court’s judgment was entered July 8, 1986. This case was orally argued and formally submitted to this Court on February 22, 1989. However, the ease was not resolved until five years later when this Court, in a per curiam opinion delivered June 8, 1994, affirmed appellant’s conviction but reformed the sentence from death to confinement for life. Soria v. State (Tex.Cr.App. No. 69,679, delivered June 8,1994) (not published). Our decision was far from unanimous. Judges Clinton, Maloney and Meyers concurred with the per curiam opinion. Judge Overstreet and I dissented to the af-firmance of the conviction but concurred with the reformation. And, Judges McCormick, Miller, Campbell and White concurred in the *71 affirmance of the conviction but dissented to the reformation.
Our decision to reform appellant’s sentence was not popular and we received a great deal of criticism from the print media and the citizenry of this State. Thereafter, the State filed its motion for rehearing on June 21, 1994. Today, more than two years later the Court reverses itself and reinstates appellant’s death sentence.
This Court has direct appellate jurisdiction of all capital eases where the death penalty is imposed. Tex. Const., art. V, § 5. The citizenry vested this Court with that authority because a statewide appellate court was thought to be more insulated from unpopular decisions than the various courts of appeals. This insulation was designed to promote the evenhanded and consistent imposition of capital punishment. Indeed, in Jurek v. Texas 428 U.S. 262, 276 , 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2958 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976), the United States Supreme Court, in holding our capital sentencing scheme constitutional, stated:
• • • [b]y providing prompt judicial review of the jury’s decision in a court with statewide jurisdiction, Texas has provided a means to promote the evenhanded, rational, and consistent imposition of death sentences under law.
In light of the foregoing history, it is clear that this Court has failed to provide prompt judicial review of this case. And, in reversing our position on original submission, it is equally clear that this Court is not operating in a manner which promotes the evenhanded, rational and consistent imposition of capital punishment. This case makes it abundantly clear that this Court has abandoned any pretense of providing the meaningful appellate review required by the Eighth Amendment. Martinez v. State, 924 S.W.2d 693, 699 (Tex.Cr.App.1996) (Baird, J., dissenting); and, Morris v. State, — S.W.2d -, -, 1996 WL 514833 (Tex.Cr.App. No. 71,799, delivered this day) (Baird, J., dissenting).
Canon 3(B)(2) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that judges shall not be swayed by partisan interest, public clamor or fear of criticism. I am not at all confident that the instant majority opinion (and the decision to publish it) meets the commands of that canon. The facts the majority relies upon today to reverse itself have been known to this Court for many years and were pointed out by Judge Campbell in his dissent on oiiginal submission.
Because the parties who have cases before us and the citizenry of this State deserve better, I dissent.
OVERSTREET, J., joins this opinion.