holding that the “dual purpose” exception allows compensation when a trip serves both business and private purposes
How later courts described this case
- holding that the “dual purpose” exception allows compensation when a trip serves both business and private purposes
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DANA, J.,
dissenting.
[¶ 14] I respectfully dissent.
[¶ 15] If Timothy Cox had asked to borrow the company track to drive to Wind-ham on a personal errand, no state would award workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries just because he had permission to drive the company truck. The result should be no different merely because immediately prior to the accident Cox had successfully and without accident completed a business delivery to a customer in the opposite direction.
[¶ 16] The hearing officer and the Court reached an opposite result by viewing the business and personal errands as one interconnected trip and then misapplying the “dual purpose” doctrine, which permits a recovery when an employee is not on a strictly personal deviation from a trip with both business and personal objectives.
[¶ 17] As the Court notes, it is hornbook law that “[w]hen an employee deviates from the business route by taking a side-trip that is clearly identifiable as such, the employee is unquestionably beyond the course of employment while going away from the business route and toward the personal objective....” 1 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW, § 17.03 (2000). Professor Larson collects twenty cases from fifteen jurisdictions applying this principle. 3 Id. This case stands alone in opposition.
. See, e.g., Havelin v. Poole Truck Lines, Inc., 395 So.2d 75 (Ala.Civ.Ct.App.1980); Harris v. Indus. Comm’n, 72 Ariz. 197 , 232 P.2d 846 (1951); Cagle v. Gladden-Driggers Co., 222 Ark. 517 , 261 S.W.2d 536 (1953); Harding v. City of Texarkana, 62 Ark.App. 137 , 970 S.W.2d 303 (1998); Boulevard Manor Nursing Home v. Lacombe, 557 So.2d 945 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990); Sunshine Jr. Food Stores, Inc. v. Thompson, 409 So.2d 190 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982); Lockwood v. Bd. of Trustees, Speedway Methodist Church, 144 Ind.App. 430 , 246 N.E.2d 774 (1969); Danos v. Great Acceptance Corp., 261 So.2d 339 (La.Ct.App.1972); Belyea’s Case, 355 Mass. 721 , 247 N.E.2d 372 (1969); Townsend v. Nelson, 308 Minn. 374 , 242 N.W.2d 607 (1976); Williams v. Hoyt Constr. Co., 306 Minn. 59 , 237 N.W.2d 339 (1975); McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303 (Miss.1989); Wilson Furniture Co. v. Wilson, 237 Miss. 512 , 115 So.2d 141 (1959); Dowdle & Pearson, Inc. v. Dependents of Hargrove, 222 Miss. 64 , 75 So.2d 277 (1954); Evans v. Consumer Programs, Inc., 849 S.W.2d 183 (Mo.Ct.App.1993); Dale v. Trade Street, Inc., 258 Mont. 349 , 854 P.2d 828 (1993); Darnell v. KN Energy, Inc., 7 Neb.App. 929 , 586 N.W.2d 484 (1998); Martino v. Dynamics Printing Corp., 33 A.D.2d 609 , 304 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1969); State v. Russo, 155 Ohio St. 341 , 98 N.E.2d 830 (1951); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Preston, 399 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.Civ.Ct.App.1966).