State introduced over objection the confession of defendant that he had hit child. Information elicited by defense counsel of defense witnesses mentioned the child beating but was intended to show that defendant’s conscious appreciation was affected by previous glue sniffing at the time of the alleged incident. This court held that appellant did not waive the objection since the questions were directed to the appellant’s state of mind, i. e., his use or non-use of glue or drugs, a fact not mentioned in the confession.
How later courts described this case
- State introduced over objection the confession of defendant that he had hit child. Information elicited by defense counsel of defense witnesses mentioned the child beating but was intended to show that defendant’s conscious appreciation was affected by previous glue sniffing at the time of the alleged incident. This court held that appellant did not waive the objection since the questions were directed to the appellant’s state of mind, i. e., his use or non-use of glue or drugs, a fact not mentioned in the confession.
- “The confession, having been taken in violation of Section 51.09, is inadmissible as a matter of law.”
- admissions made by a juvenile require careful inquiry and special caution
- “If the Legislature had intended such a result, it would have clearly said so.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBERTS, Judge
(concurring).
I concur in the opinion of the Court which I reluctantly agree correctly states the law applicable to this case. I only wish to add a few comments on the status of married juveniles in Texas.
In the case at bar, appellant was protected as a “child” under V.T.C.A., Family Code, Sec. 51.09(1). Yet it was also shown that he was married at the time of the offense. V.T.C.A., Family Code, Sec. 4.03 provides:
“Except as expressly provided by statute or by the constitution, every person who has been married in accordance with the law of this state, regardless of age, has the power and capacity of an adult . . . ” (Emphasis added)
This provision has been given broad effect. See, for example, Ex Parte Williams, 420 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.1967) construing V.A.C.S., Art. 4625, a predecessor of Sec. 4.03. But it has been interpreted to have no bearing upon the question of crimes committed by juvenile delinquents. See Op.Atty.Gen., 1947, V-77. Sec. 51.09 is, of course, a more recently enacted and specific exception to Sec. 4.03.
*518 It should also be noted that V.T.C.A., Probate Code, See. 3(t) defines “minors” in the following way:
“. . . all persons under twenty-one years of age who have never been married, except persons under that age whose disabilities have been removed generally, except as to the right to vote, in accordance with the laws of this State.” (Emphasis added)
Pittman v. Time Securities, 301 S.W.2d 521 (Tex.Civ.App., San Antonio, 1957, no writ history) held that Sec. 3(t), supra, had general application and that males under twenty-one who were married were adults for all purposes, not just for purposes of the Probate Code. Pittman was followed by Ward v. Lavy, 314 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1958, no writ) and Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Mattox, 345 S.W.2d 290 (Tex.Civ.App., Texarkana, 1961, err. ref’d, n. r. e.). Art. 5923b, V.A.C.S., Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 1723, ch. 626, eff. August 27, 1973 lowered the age of majority to eighteen years of age and continued the general applicability of Sec. 3(t) as held by Pittman , et al., Op.Atty.Gen., 1973, H-82. Art. 5923b, supra, wás also being construed by the Attorney General when he wrote:
“Persons who are married, regardless of their age, have the status of adults.” Op. Atty.Gen., 1973, H — 85 (rendered August 13, 1973).
Texas thus has a broad scheme of statutory and decisional law emancipating all married “children” under the age of eighteen years, except as to the right to vote which was controlled by Art. VI, Sec. 1 of the Texas Constitution, Vernon’s Ann.St. Sec. 51.09 of Title III of the Family Code appears to contain the only legislative' exception to this rule in the jurisprudence of this State. I am unable to understand why the Legislature has deemed it necessary to coddle minors who otherwise enjoy the full complement of rights and responsibilities of adulthood.
I note that the 64th Legislature has wisely moved to mitigate the more extreme aspects of Sec. 51.09. It recently enacted S.B. 247 which now permits a “child” to waive his Fifth Amendment rights and confess in the absence of a lawyer. Except for a few other minor changes, S.B. 247 leaves the unique effect of Sec. 51.09 intact. And, of course, Sec. 51.09 remains as an exception to the rule that marriage emancipates a “child.”
For these reasons, I concur.