holding that fighting words and “libelous utterances,” particularly those that are peripheral or insignificant to the labor issues involved, are not protected communications under parallel provisions of the NLRA
How later courts described this case
- holding that fighting words and “libelous utterances,” particularly those that are peripheral or insignificant to the labor issues involved, are not protected communications under parallel provisions of the NLRA
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen :
In view of the lack of authority for the proposition that the state’s interest in defamation is as great as the state’s interest in physical violence, I prefer to follow the well reasoned federal and state authorities to the effect that state-based actions for defamation arising out of a labor dispute are precluded, because regulation of the conduct in question is subject to the exclusive primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board over unfair labor practices and representation elections. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 337 F. 2d 68 (6th Cir. 1964) ; Blum v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389 , 201 A. 2d 46 (1964) ; Hill v. Moe, 367 P. 2d 739 (S. Ct. Alaska 1961), cert. den., 370 U.S. 916 (1962) ; Warehouse & Produce Workers Local 559, IBT v. United States Gypsum Co., 50 C.C.H. Lab. Cas. ¶19,196 (Superior Ct. Wash. 1963); Schnell Tool & Die Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 200 N.E. 2d 727 (Ohio C.P. 1964). These cases are clearly within the spirit of the recent United States Supreme Court pronouncements on preemption of state tort actions arising out of labor disputes. See Iron Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963) and Local 100, United Association of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
*417 While the reputation and character of employees aud employers may not be the primary concern of the NLRB in defining the area of permissible speech in labor disputes, it is patent that the development of fifty state laws of defamation cannot adequately deal with the needs of free flow of communication in such disputes. The Commonwealth’s interest in defamation in the course of labor disputes is not great enough to warrant submersion of the vital need for uniformity of federal regulation of labor relations. This is not merely a case of the Commonwealth’s interest colliding with that of the federal government, for it is the Commonwealth, like all states, that reaps the benefit of sound labor relations.
Accordingly, I dissent.