determining subsequent questioning by both State and defense counsel made it clear venire member did not expect appellant to testify or present other evidence but only that his attorneys would do their best on his behalf and concluding trial court did not err by overruling challenge for cause because “It is obvious that [the venire member] was initially confused as to the relationship between appellant’s right to remain silent and his right to effective assistance of counsel.”
How later courts described this case
- determining subsequent questioning by both State and defense counsel made it clear venire member did not expect appellant to testify or present other evidence but only that his attorneys would do their best on his behalf and concluding trial court did not err by overruling challenge for cause because “It is obvious that [the venire member] was initially confused as to the relationship between appellant’s right to remain silent and his right to effective assistance of counsel.”
- concluding that prospective juror was not challengeable for cause on basis that he could not give minimum punishment in murder case when, after rehabilitation by State, juror stated that he “could consider the minimum punishment in a proper case”
- testimony that accused was an escapee from New Mexico where he was wanted for criminal sexual penetration of a minor held admissible in trial for murder of police officer who stopped accused for questioning
- “It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” (quoting Murphy v. 9 Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting in part.
To the overruling of the twelve ground's of error concerning admission of evidence showing commission of extraneous offenses in New Mexico, I respectfully dissent. The Court appears to recognize other proof made by the State and to acknowledge that it showed appellant killed Levin from a more immediate, localized motivation. Given the obvious prejudicial impact of the extraneous New Mexico offenses, I cannot agree that we may tolerate it on the double, negative theory that existence of other motives for killing Levin “does not mean that he was not motivated by a desire to avoid his return to New- Mexico.” It seems clear to me that this is the classic case where slight probative value is far outweighed by heavy prejudice.
PHILLIPS, J., joins.