holding that by virtue of the exclusivity provision of section 303(a) of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, an émployer may not even be joined as an additional defendant by a third-party tortfeasor where the injury or death is job related
How later courts described this case
- holding that by virtue of the exclusivity provision of section 303(a) of the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, an émployer may not even be joined as an additional defendant by a third-party tortfeasor where the injury or death is job related
- holding that the Pennsylvania Legislature did not contemplate an apportionment of liability between one or more third party tortfeasors against whom recovery may be had and a plaintiff's employer against whom there can be no recovery
- holding that there is no role for the employer in an action by an employee against a third party, making workers’ compensation policies all but irrelevant
- holding section 303 precludes joinder of employer as additional defendant for purposes of apportioning fault
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LARSEN, Justice,
concurring.
I join with the majority except to point out thaL subrogation rights are always subject to equitable principles. See Bigley v. Unity Auto Parts, Inc., 496 Pa. 262, 274 , 436 A.2d 1172, 1178 (1981); Dale Manufacturing Co. v. Bressi, 491 Pa. 493, 496 , 421 A.2d 653, 654 (1980). Thus, the employer’s right to subrogation is not automatic and some judicial proceeding must be had in order for the employer’s lack or degree of fault to be established. See Tsarnas v. Jones & *110 Laughlin Steel Corporation, 488 Pa. 513 , 412 A.2d 1094 (1980) (Larsen, J., concurring).