finding that Appellant’s signature on the government form was appropriately used as a handwriting exemplar to compare to the signatures on the checks drawn on Goodman’s account, and that testimony concerning the use of the name “Anna” King when checking into a motel near the prison was probative of Appellant’s knowledge that Martin would be improperly absent from prison and of her desire to facilitate his escape
How later courts described this case
- finding that Appellant’s signature on the government form was appropriately used as a handwriting exemplar to compare to the signatures on the checks drawn on Goodman’s account, and that testimony concerning the use of the name “Anna” King when checking into a motel near the prison was probative of Appellant’s knowledge that Martin would be improperly absent from prison and of her desire to facilitate his escape
- explaining that there “was no need for an expert to testify to the fear that [the victim] felt in his confrontation with [the defendants]—the fact that a human being would experience fear [during a violent episode] is so basic that expert opinion is unnecessary to assist the jury”
- holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting photograph depicting the manner in which the victim was tied and which showed graphic signs of the body’s decomposition, including blackening of hands and secretion of bodily fluids
- pointing out that a Simmons instruction was not required when "the issue of future dangerousness was not before the jury. At no time during either phase of trial did the prosecutor argue or suggest that the death penalty should be imposed because Appellants could potentially hurt someone else. . . ."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion except for the discussion of whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of the aggravating circumstance of torture. Maj. Opinion at 780-781. As the majority does with the Appellant’s claims of error regarding the trial court’s instructions, see footnote 10, I believe it is unnecessary to address this issue in light of the conclusion that “the trial court erred in permitting the jury to consider this aggravator in its penalty determination.” Id. at 782.