holding evidence seized in violation of the federal (Tex.Crim.App.1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 67 , 96 S.Ct. 304 , constitution inadmissible, and noting that over half the 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975), on remand, 543 S.W.2d 366 states had already adopted this approach
How later courts described this case
- holding evidence seized in violation of the federal (Tex.Crim.App.1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 67 , 96 S.Ct. 304 , constitution inadmissible, and noting that over half the 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975), on remand, 543 S.W.2d 366 states had already adopted this approach
- noting that search was invalid under state constitution, but that the argument was waived
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Borner v. State, 1975 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 922 (1975)
Likewise, White v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 521 S.W.2d 255 (1974), is distinguishable but the difference is not so apparent as in the Taylor case, supra.
The opinion
ON STATE'S MOTION FOR REHEARING
MORRISON, Judge
(dissenting).
At the time this case was first submitted on rehearing, Judge Jackson, then a Commissioner with this Court, prepared an opinion which I now adopt as my dissent.
“We have concluded that the search of appellant’s automobile at the police station was legal, and the evidence thus obtained was admissible.
It is conceded that appellant’s arrest was legal and that probable cause existed for *259 the search incident to that arrest at that time, but it is contended that the removal of the automobile to the police station and the warrantless search some 30 to SO minutes later was not proper.
The record shows that the felony committed in the officer’s presence was at a drive-in window of a bank on a busy street, and that, it was not practical to search there. It was more consistent with the safety and convenience of the appellant, his automobile, and the officers to remove the car to the police station to complete the search incident to the arrest.
The fact that in the meantime the officers sought to obtain consent from appellant for the search, which was refused, in no way militated against the right to search, and was reasonable under the circumstances.
The entire series of events culminating in the recovery of additional forged checks from appellant’s automobile was one continuous transaction. As was said in Taylor v. State [Tex.Cr.App.], 421 S.W.2d 403 , cert. denied, 393 U.S. 916 , 89 S.Ct. 241 , 21 L.Ed.2d 201 , opinion on appellant’s motion for rehearing, ‘the removal of this automobile to Marshall, and the subsequent search were a series of events constituting one continuous happening.’
We have also approved later warrantless searches under similar facts in Lara v. State [Tex.Cr.App.], 469 S.W.2d 177 , on appellant’s motion for rehearing; and in Gomez v. State [Tex.Cr.App.], 470 S.W.2d 871 . These holdings are in accord with Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 , 90 S. Ct., 1975 , 26 L.Ed.2d 419 , . . .
We have considered the additional grounds of error presented by appellant and find them to be without merit.
The State’s Motion for Rehearing is granted and the judgment is affirmed.
JACKSON, Commissioner”
I dissent.