The opinion
JOHN L. MILLER, Senior District Judge
(dissenting).
The majority conclude the Department of Welfare Regulation now before the Court is irrational and creates an invidious classification in violation of the equal protection of the laws. I differ and believe regulation 3131.12 to be a reasonable or rational effort upon the Commonwealth to tackle one aspect of the larger problems of the poor and needy. This conclusion is in part based upon my view regulation 3122.22 is applicable to that program identified as “Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)” which is but one of many programs administered by the Commonwealth. Regulation 3122.22 has been relied upon by plaintiffs’ counsel and the majority in their analysis and considerations of the alleged disparity of treatment of minor general welfare applicants. My difficulty with this approach is the application of different regulations pertaining to two distinctly separate assistance programs, Aid to Dependent Children vis-a-vis General assistance, to arrive at an equal protection violation. It is subsumed that regulation 3122.22 is applicable to general assistance even though its short title in the Welfare Manual appears under the heading “Aid to Dependent Children.” Set aside are the significant distinctions between existing assistance programs administered by the respective defendants. In our case plaintiffs are general assistance applicants. Although acknowledged, forgotten are the clear social purposes and scope of the programs of federal interest as distinguished from state assistance to the needy — general assistance.
Regulation 3122.22 is an implementation of the federal program mandated by the Social Security Act and places emphasis upon maintaining the unemancipated minor in the family unit or family structure, whereas regulation 3131.12 speaks of general assistance to minors who are not eligible for ADC or AD. (Emphasis added). The majority interweaves these two regulations in arriving at their ultimate finding of a denial of equal protection. If one considers the emphasis upon the family unit or family structure of the federal programs, the diverse and varying categories of welfare programs and specifically the child welfare program and the informal placement arrangement acknowledged by Mr. Hardin, the total social welfare structure and policies of the Commonwealth can be characterized as a reasonable effort to meet the needs of all its citizens. The Commonwealth in its effort does not violate the equal protection clause because the classifications made by its law are imperfect. The eligibility criteria for general assistance minors not residing with parents has some “reasonabls basis” when considered in light of the federal and state priorities emphasizing the maintenance of the unemancipated minor child in the family unit, that is, residing with his or her parents or relatives; and, the Commonwealth’s efforts, within constraints of its funds, to provide general assistance to those minors residing not in foster homes or state fa *552 cilities but with other persons who have voluntarily assumed the responsibility for the minor’s care and custody. As the Supreme Court observed in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 , 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), “[i]f the classification has some ‘reasonable basis’, it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ [Citation omitted.] The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations — illogical it may be, and unscientific.” [Citations omitted.]
The Fourteenth Amendment cannot be construed to empower this Court to strike down the Commonwealth’s regulation because it may be unwise, improvident or inconsistent with the views of the judges as to what constitutes wise economic and social policy. Dandridge v. Williams, supra. While different policy judgments are possible, it is not irrational for the Commonwealth to limit grants of public assistance for unemancipated minors, not eligible for ADC or AD and living with a person other than a parent, to persons who are receiving assistance. With the stresses upon its available general assistance funds, it is a reasonably legitimate policy judgment of the Commonwealth to undertake to preserve the unemancipated minor children living with his or her parents in the family structure. Such policy would be consistent with the federal policy as set forth in the Social Security Act and Amendments, 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 . Whether or not one agrees with the Commonwealth’s determination, there is nothing in the Constitution requiring it to choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 , 31 S.Ct. 337 , 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911). The Supreme Court in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546 , 92 S.Ct. 1724, 1731 , 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972), acknowledged that legislative efforts to come to grips with the problems of the poor and needy are “not subject to a constitutional straitjaeket” and observed, “[t]he very complexity of the problems suggests that there will be more than one constitutionally permissible method of solving them.” “A legislature may address a problem ‘one step at a time,’ or even ‘select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.’ ” Id. Furthermore, the Court in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 , 91 S.Ct. 1331, 1334 , 28 L.Ed.2d 678 (1971) observed “ * * * a lawmaking procedure that ‘disadvantages’ a particular group does not always deny equal protection.”
The Court today interprets social and economic policy of which we are not the arbiter; they are appropriately a matter for the legislative forum.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s re-emphasis in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 551 , 92 S.Ct. 1724, 1734 , 32 L.Ed.2d 285 (1972) of its earlier observation in Dandridge v. Williams, supra, is appropriate :
“We do not decide today that the [state law] is wise, that it best fulfills the relevant social and economic objectives that [the State] might ideally espouse, or that a more just and humane system could not be devised. Conflicting claims of morality and intelligence are raised by opponents and proponents of almost every measure, certainly including the one before us. But the intractable economic, social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are not the business of this Court. . . . [T]he Constitution does not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients.”