holding there was probable cause to arrest where defendants were in a car that was stopped "a few minutes" after robbery in a car "about five or ten blocks" from where robbery occurred, car was heading away from the scene of the crime and had run a red light and car's occupants matched "descriptions of the suspects""height, weight, color, facial hair, length of hair, stringy hair and all that sort of stuff" even though there was significant discrepancy in height of one of the suspects
How later courts described this case
- holding there was probable cause to arrest where defendants were in a car that was stopped "a few minutes" after robbery in a car "about five or ten blocks" from where robbery occurred, car was heading away from the scene of the crime and had run a red light and car's occupants matched "descriptions of the suspects""height, weight, color, facial hair, length of hair, stringy hair and all that sort of stuff" even though there was significant discrepancy in height of one of the suspects
- substantial overlap between Rule 33 and 28 U.S.C. § 2255
- “the inference is inescapable that the required link in the chain of communication is satisfied [since officers having probable cause remained present while others searched car]”
- probable cause, where arres-tees largely matched report of crime "by one white male, one white female, and one black male,” with "rather particularized descriptions of each”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NEBEKER, Associate Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the opinion of the court and in the conclusion that appellants’ Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial was not denied. As my concurring opinion in Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 787 (No. 11934, decided this date) reveals, I question the role which this court plays in the decision of speedy trial issues. We continue to say that the government has a burden to show no prejudice to the accused. That is, to my way of thinking, a virtual impossibility at the trial level, to say nothing of an initial burden in this court. While pretrial incarceration and reasons therefor are easily ascertained from the record on appeal, we have no way of knowing on most records whether the accused experienced sufficient anxiety and concern because of the pending charges and delay to warrant a finding of prejudice. Likewise, if impairment of defense is a factor, we are ill-equipt to decide the factual existence of that type of prejudice.
In similar context, it is also regrettable that our opinions, including this one, have continually used such words as “prima facie merit” in assessing threshold validity of a speedy trial claim, “strong evidentiary weight” respecting timely assertion of the right, “proof” as to a showing of denial of a speedy trial, and requiring “the government to show no prejudice to the accused.” These terms are appropriate if we review trial court proceedings where such eviden-tiary terms have meaning. Those terms have no place at the appellate level when specific facts have not been determined at the trial level.
Here, as in Bethea , the only action by the trial court upon assertion of a speedy trial right was a perfunctory denial before trial. No further trial court procedures were had on the issue and we again undertake to treat the claim firsthand through our usual recitation and consideration of four Barker v. Wingo * inquiries.
*813 I find no basis on this record to grant the extraordinary and costly relief of dismissal for failure to afford a speedy trial. Consistent with my concurrence in Bethea , I would leave all questions respecting reasons for delay, timeliness and sincerity of assertion of the right, and prejudice to proceedings in the trial court. I would also require the accused to offer a basis in relevant facts (Barker v. Wingo, supra) for his motion to dismiss. As in most speedy trial cases in this court, the record contains a perfunctory claim and denial. More is ordinarily required for dismissal.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).