brewing and possessing beer for personal use, if not for sale, was not a moral turpitude offense
How later courts described this case
- brewing and possessing beer for personal use, if not for sale, was not a moral turpitude offense
- "[T]heft, whether it be grand or petit larceny!,] involves moral turpitude.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TRIEBER, District Judge
(concurring). I concur in the reversal as announced by Judge LEWIS, but not in all the reasons expressed in his opinion. I fully concur in the concurring opinion of Judge KENTON, and only wish to add to his opinion that it is unnecessary to discuss in this case what constitutes moral turpitude.
In my opinion no person should be en *732 rolled as an attorney, who knowingly violates, not only a law of the nation, but also a constitutional provision. A person who commits such an offense is not, in my opinion, a man of such moral character as one desiring to become a member of the legal profession should be, as is so ably stated in the opinion of Judge KENYON.
If, after his admission, his conduct is such that, had it been established when he applied for admission to the bar, the court would have denied his enrollment, it is the duty of the court to revoke it. In People v. Keegan, 18 Colo. 237 , 32 P. 424 , 36 Am. S.t. Rep. 274, •it was said:
0 “A good moral character is one of the essential requisites to admission to the bar in this state, and the tenure of office thereby conferred is during good behavior; and when it appears, upon full investigation, that an attorney has forfeited his /good moral character,’ it becomes the duty of the court to revoke the authority it gave him upon his admission.”
To the same effect see, in addition to the authorities cited by Judge KENYON, Matter of Wool, 36 Mich. 299 ; State v. McClaugherty, 33 W. Va. 250 , 10 S. E. 407 ; In re Delano, 58 N. H. 5, 42 Am. Rep. 555 ; People v. Baker, 311 Ill. 66 , 142 N. E. 554 , 31 A. L. R. 737.
The argument of learned counsel for plaintiff in error that, this constitutional amendment and the National Prohibition Act, enacted to carry this amendment to the Constitution into effect, is being violated by men of high standing in their respective communities, is no excuse. It is deplorable that this is a fact, and unfortunate that such violators are not as frequently punished as they should be. But the prohibition law is not the only law which is being violated by these men. The laws against gambling, carrying concealed weapons, and more serious laws are violated daily; but shall, for that reason, violators when brought to the bar of justice be left unpunished?
The manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors has, long before the enactment of the prohibition laws, been considered immoral, and many of the secret societies, such as Masons, Odd Eellows, Knights of Pythias, and similar organizations, have denied them admission long before the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment and the National Prohibition Act. Should members of the legal profession adopt a lower standard of morality than these organizations?
My reasons for concurring in a reversal are that the evidence does not show an intentional violation of the law by Mr. Bartos. Some of the prohibition enforcement officers had publicly stated that the manufacture of beer for one’s use, although containing a prohibited amount of alcohol, was not a violation of the law, and many newspapers published statements to the same effect. This, as the evidence establishes, caused Mr. Bartos to manufacture the beer, in the honest belief that he did not violate the law by making the beer for his own use and his guests.
I believe, as stated by Judge KENYON in his concurring opinion, a reprimand would have been a sufficient punishment upon the facts in the case.