observing that the making of a photographic negative, which does not itself become an integral part of the finished process, is an essential part of the taxpayer’s business and involves a change in the composition and character of the film for use by the manufacturer in making the portrait
How later courts described this case
- observing that the making of a photographic negative, which does not itself become an integral part of the finished process, is an essential part of the taxpayer’s business and involves a change in the composition and character of the film for use by the manufacturer in making the portrait
- holding that cameras and film used in making custom made portraits were used in the manufacture of personal property for purposes of exclusion from tax
- production of custom-made portraits
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
Anyone who ever snapped the shutter of a camera would be surprised indeed to learn that, in the majority’s view, he is engaged in “manufacturing.” The majority reaches its result by holding the mere exposure of film to be “manufacturing.” Accordingly, the Commonwealth by today’s decision is precluded from imposing tax 1 on the use by appellant within this state of film and specialized cameras.
I dissent and would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court. In my view, the principles enunciated in Commonwealth v. Deitch Co., 449 Pa. 88 , 295 A.2d 834 (1972), and Commonwealth v. Berlo Tending Co., 415 Pa. 101 , 202 A.2d 94 (1964), control this case and compel a result contrary to that reached by the majority.
In Deitch this Court held that “the compression of old automobiles into blocks of steel,” 449 Pa. at 97 , 295 A.2d at 839 , did not constitute manufacturing. This Court in Berlo Tending, held that the “popping” of com was not manufacturing. Again, I do not see how the ma *87 jority can. conclude that the simple act of snapping a shutter is “manufacturing.”
Even were appellant’s operation viewed as a whole to be considered manufacturing, appellant would nevertheless be foreclosed, by virtue of Commonwealth v. Weldon Pajamas, Inc., 482 Pa. 481 , 248 A.2d 204 (1968), from claiming the manufacturing exclusion. See Commonwealth v. Olan Mills, Inc., 1 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 230 , 274 A.2d 272 (1971). Appellant’s entire process of developing exposed film, making proofs and prints from negatives, retouching prints, placing oil and water colors on prints, and baking the final product in an oven takes place outside of this Commonwealth. This Court was of the view in Weldon Pajamas that, except in a single circumstance 2 not relevant here, “[historically, the manufacturing exemption . . . has been reserved to those corporations organized for manufacturing purposes and actually engaged in manufacturing in Pennsylvania.” Id. at 484, 248 A.2d at 205 .
What the majority unfortunately overlooks is the legislative policy behind the exemption or exclusion of manufacturing from tax liability. The sole reason for the legislative choice to confer these tax benefits is to stimulate and encourage manufacturing in Pennsylvania. Appellant’s manufacturing, as the Commonwealth Court correctly held, took place outside of Pennsylvania; the reason for the exclusion (exemption) does not exist; the tax was here properly assessed.
The majority seeks to buttress its conclusion by gnomic references to the Statutory Construction Act. For my part, the only canon of statutory construction applicable here is that which instructs the court not to *88 reach an absurd result. 1 Pa.S. § 1901 (Special Pamphlet, 1973).
Only by ignoring this canon can the absurd conclusion that the snapping of a shutter of a camera is manufacturing be reached. If, as the majority believes, the mere snapping of a camera’s shutter is manufacturing, what then is not?
Tax Act of 1963 for Education, Act of May 29, 1963, P.L. 49, 72 P.S. §§ 3403-1 to -205 (1964), as amended, 72 P.S. §§ 7101-7282 (Supp. 1973).
“The exception to this rule relates to a corporation organized for manufacturing purposes and owning a manufacturing plant which is leased to another corporation which is actually engaged in manufacturing.” Commonwealth v. Weldon Pajamas, Inc., 432 Pa. 481, 484 , 248 A.2d 204, 205 (1968).