uncontested judgment nisi recital that the defendant’s name was called at the “courthouse door” served as conclusive proof
How later courts described this case
- uncontested judgment nisi recital that the defendant’s name was called at the “courthouse door” served as conclusive proof
- denial of execution, failure of principal to appear, whether name called at courthouse door, and reason for non-appearance all fact issues
- opinion on State’s second motion for rehearing
- opinion on second motion for rehearing
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ODOM, Judge
(dissenting).
The State’s motion for rehearing has been overruled without written opinion.
On original submission these judgments were reversed because the bonds did not designate a proper court where the principal was to appear.
We now have been furnished a supplemental transcript which includes docket sheet entries in the three causes involved. The docket sheet entries affirmatively show that on November 19, 1971, Wanda Harman, the principal, appeared in the 104th District Court of Taylor County, and was duly arraigned, with attorney present, “and on plea of not guilty case set for trial on 3/13/72.” The next entry on the docket sheet shows that the bonds were forfeited on June 5, 1972.
In Landrum v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 106 , 345 S.W.2d 752 , this court stated:
“ . . . all that is required is that the principal know where and in what court he was to appear. This he clearly did.”
It is now clear that the principal in the case at bar knew when and in what court she was to appear.
I would grant the State’s motion for rehearing, set aside the reversal, and affirm the judgment.
I respectfully dissent.
MORRISON, J., joins in this dissent.