finding that intermediate appeals court improperly granted mandamus relief when what applicant actually sought was post-conviction habeas relief; observing that court of criminal appeals was “the only court with jurisdiction in final post-conviction felony proceedings”
How later courts described this case
- finding that intermediate appeals court improperly granted mandamus relief when what applicant actually sought was post-conviction habeas relief; observing that court of criminal appeals was “the only court with jurisdiction in final post-conviction felony proceedings”
- holding that in granting a writ of mandamus to vacate a judgment of conviction on the basis of an allegedly invalid guilty plea, a court of appeals usurped the exclusive authority of the court of criminal appeals to grant postconviction relief
- holding that court of appeals’ granting writ of mandamus to vacate judgment of conviction on basis of allegedly invalid guilty plea usurped exclusive authority of Court of Criminal Appeals to grant postconviction relief
- holding that since the applicant’s attempt to vacate his felony conviction could be reviewed through an habeas proceeding initiated under art. 11.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, mandamus could not issue
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
Being constrained to join the judgment of the Court does not preclude me from observing that the very fact of this prolonged litigation demonstrates once again the folly in ever bestowing upon courts of appeals jurisdiction, power and authority to issue writs of mandamus in criminal law matters. Dickens v. Court of Appeals, 727 S.W.2d 542 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (Clinton, J., dissenting at 553 ff.).
*244 According to our record, pursuant to a plea bargain the original judgment was made November 27, 1984; the order revoking probation was signed June 26, 1986; on July 8, 1987, the court of appeals vacated punishment part of the latter and reinstated the former, after reforming it by deleting the initial grant of probation; a nunc pro tunc judgment including for the first time a purported “affirmative” deadly weapon finding was entered October 22, 1987.
The record does not reveal the present status of the real party in interest, Cecilio Reyna, now more than six years since submitting his plea bargain to the trial court.