The opinion
NIX, Justice,
dissenting.
In my judgment, the majority has grievously erred in its conclusion that 42 Pa.C.S.A. section 3133 (1978) is compatible with the provisions of the Constitution of this Commonwealth. I am, therefore, compelled to register my dissent and to set forth my reasons for reaching a contrary position. Even accepting the presumption of constitutionality that statutory enactments are to be accorded, Parker v. Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia, 483 Pa. 106 , 394 A.2d 932 (1978); Hosiery v. Commonwealth, 469 Pa. 92 , 364 A.2d 919 (1976); Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387 , 346 A.2d 897 (1975); Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263 , 191 A.2d 835 (1963); a reasonable interpretation of the clear and unambiguous language of the Constitution, viewed in its proper historical setting, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the Constitution prohibits limited voting for judicial officers. 1
Article 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides for three methods of selecting justices, judges and justices of the peace: election pursuant to Section 13(a), retention election under Section 15(b) and appointment under Section 13(b). 2 Abraham v. Shapp et al., 483 Pa. 573 , 400 A.2d 1249 , (1979) . Since the instantly challenged method of judicial selection obviously does not purport to comply with either Section 13(b) or 15(b), the narrow question presented in this appeal is whether the scheme of limited voting set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A., section 3133 qualifies as an election pursuant *446 to section 13(a). Section 13(a) “mandates elections for statewide judgeships by the ‘electors of the Commonwealth’.” Abraham v. Shapp, supra, 483 Pa. 577 , 400 A.2d p. 1251. “The implication is clear, judges who are to serve statewide must be elected to do so by the electors who are to be served, namely, the electors of the Commonwealth.” Id. A system of limited voting, such as that fashioned pursuant to the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S.A., section 3133, which does not permit all of the electors to participate in the selection of the candidates for each judicial office to be filled is clearly not within the mandate of section 13(a). 3 I am, therefore, forced to conclude that since the electors of this Commonwealth are precluded from electing one of the three seats to be filled, under the provision of section 3133, that provision is clearly, palpably and plainly violative of section 13(a).
The majority attempts to gloss over the blatant constitutional deficiency of section 3133, by lauding the alleged benefits of political minority representation on the Commonwealth Court. 4 This reasoning clearly misses the mark. *447 Regardless of the wisdom of a particular method of judicial selection, the critical question raised here is whether it is in accordance with the organic law of this Commonwealth. Section 13(a) provides that ". . . judges shall be elected ... by the electors of the Commonwealth. . . .” The term “shall” has generally been interpreted as being mandatory. Fishkin v. Hi-Acres, Inc., 462 Pa. 309 , 341 A.2d 95 (1975); Amal. Trans. U., Div. 85 v. Port Alleg. Co., 417 Pa. 299 , 208 A.2d 271 (1965). Further, there is nothing in the language of 13(a) that would authorize an election of a candidate for a statewide judicial post by a portion of the electors of the Commonwealth. In Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 , 84 S.Ct. 526 , 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964), the United States Supreme Court pertinently observed:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having a choice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, they must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.
Wesberry v. Sanders, supra at 17, 84 S.Ct. at 535 . The scheme of limited voting proposed in Section 3133 represents an unwarranted and unauthorized erosion of the franchise and cannot be countenanced.
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise, (emphasis added).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 , 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1378 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964).
The result reached by the majority in this appeal is even more inexplicable in light of this Court’s recent decision in Abraham v. Shapp, supra. In Abraham v. Shapp, supra, a *448 majority of the Court rejected the premise that the election of an individual by the electorate within a judicial district was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 13(a) and allow that judicial officer to serve a full 10-year term on a court of statewide jurisdiction. Under section 3133, one-third of the electors voting would determine the candidate to fill the third seat. While this may be a difference in degree, it is surely not a difference in kind. In Abraham v. Shapp, supra, the majority stated: “In the context of a discussion of the election process to fill a public office, we have indicated the right of the elector to select between persons is necessary.” (emphasis added). 400 A.2d p. 1253. Yet today, the majority approves a scheme wherein two-thirds of the voters will have no say in the selection of the person filling one of the judicial seats.
The majority relies heavily upon our decision in Com. ex rel. McCormick v. Reeder, 171 Pa. 505 , 33 A. 67 (1895) to support its conclusion. I believe that a proper analysis of that decision indicates that it not only fails to support the majority’s position but rather is in conflict with it. In Reeder , we upheld by a five to two vote, a limited voting scheme for the election of judges to the then newly created Superior Court. Crucial to that decision was the fact that the Superior Court had been legislatively created (and not constitutionally mandated) and that the Constitution at that time had expressly provided for limited voting for the election of Supreme Court justices. Pa.Const. art. 5, section 16 (1874). The opinion was clear in expressing that the Court was persuaded that since there was a provision for limited voting for the only constitutionally mandated statewide court at that time, the Constitution could not be viewed as prohibiting limited voting in a legislatively created court of statewide jurisdiction. Moreover, the result of the Reeder Court was further supported by art. 12, section 1 which provided “All officers whose selection is not provided for in this constitution shall be elected or appointed, as may be directed by law.” (emphasis added). See present art. 6, section 1 (1968). The Reeder Court was satisfied that for *449 mer art. 12, section 1, was controlling since nothing else in the former Constitution prevented such a result.
The situation under the 1968 Amendment is entirely different. The Commonwealth Court was constitutionally mandated, art. 5, section 1, and was not simply a creature of legislative fiat. The former provision for limited voting for Supreme Court justices was deleted in the 1968 Constitutional Amendment. Unlike the situation presented in Reeder , as conceded by the majority, the selection of the judges to fill the seats under scrutiny is governed by Section 13(a) of the Constitution, thus art. 6, section 1 (the counterpart of former art. 12, section 1) is not available as support for the majority’s result reached in this appeal. Most significant, and ignored by the majority, is that the Reeder Court was able to avoid a determination as to whether the language requiring “election by qualified electors” was incompatible with a scheme of limited voting. Under the 1874 Constitution this requirement was expressly limited to the election of district judges of the common pleas, art. 5, section 15, thus the Reeder Court could legitimately say that it was not applicable to the election of judges of a court of statewide jurisdiction, Com. ex rel. McCormick v. Reeder, supra at 515, 33 A. at 68 . Here a resolution of this question was crucial, yet the majority has attempted to skirt the issue.
For the reasons stated, I am of the view that section 3183 provides a scheme of judicial selection that is not in accord with the mandate of art. 5, section 13(a) of the Constitution and, therefore, should not be permitted to stand.
LARSEN, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.
. We are not here concerned with the constitutionality of limited voting provisions for elected non-judicial public officials. I, therefore, express no opinion as to that subject.
. The voters of Pennsylvania rejected the selection option offered in Section 13(d).
. Under section 3133, although these seats on the Commonwealth Court are to be filled in the forthcoming general election, each elector is being restricted to voting for only two candidates for nomination and election. I am in agreement with the majority that the attempt to construe section 3133 as applying only to the general election is pure nonsense.
. Implicit in this reasoning is the assumption that the candidate, once elected, will continue to reflect a particular political philosophy in the discharge of his judicial responsibilities. I for one do not share such a jaundice view of the judiciary in this Commonwealth. While I agree that the bench should be reflective of the various cultural, ethnic and religious groups of our society, I do not accept that this goal is realistically fostered by mandating representation by political minorities.
The absurdity of the majority’s position is further demonstrated by the result that could be reached under their view. When we consider that there are principally two major political parties in this state offering a slate of candidates for election and that frequently they comprise the only candidates seeking election, coupled with the fact that we permit cross filing in judicial elections, it is possible that the same two candidates will be nominated on both the Democratic and Republican tickets. Thus, we could be faced with a situation where the third seat could not be filled through the election process. Such a possibility would frustrate the recognized preference in our constitutional scheme for judicial officers to be selected through the elec *447 tion process. Barbieri v. Shapp, 476 Pa. 513 , 383 A.2d 218 (1978); Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452 , 366 A.2d 574 (1976).