indicating that mitigating circumstances should not be overly broadly defined but, generally, refer to defendant’s character or record, circumstances of the offense, or statutorily listed mitigating circumstances
How later courts described this case
- indicating that mitigating circumstances should not be overly broadly defined but, generally, refer to defendant’s character or record, circumstances of the offense, or statutorily listed mitigating circumstances
- "[The Sixth Amendment] grants to the accused the right to make his defense, for it is he who suffers the consequences."
- even if a defendant is found competent to stand trial, "he may not be capable of making an intelligent decision about his defense"
- interpreting Faretta and the Sixth Amendment to require a trial court to hold a hearing to determine if defendant knowingly and voluntarily elected to waive insanity defense
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by St. Clair v. Commonwealth, 2014 Ky. LEXIS 341 (2014)
870 S.W.2d 412 (Ky. 1994), overruled on other grounds by St. Clair v. 8 Commonwealth, 451 S.W.3d 597
The opinion
WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I do not believe Jacobs was entitled to a change of venue and it was not error to permit defense counsel to present an insanity defense.
The conviction of Jacobs should not be reversed because he was not absolutely entitled to a change of venue. Jacobs was not denied a fair and impartial jury in this ease. It is not the amount of publicity which determines that venue should be changed. It is whether public opinion is so aroused as to prevent a fair trial. Foster v. Commonwealth, Ky., 827 S.W.2d 670 (1992). In this case the trial judge permitted attorneys for the parties great discretion in questioning those persons summoned for jury duty in order to ascertain whether they had any preconceived opinions that would interfere with their impartiality as jurors. Mere knowledge of the case is not sufficient to excuse jurors or to change venue. The critical test is whether the jury had formed an opinion regarding guilt or innocence or that the information affected a juror’s ability to render a verdict based on the evidence presented at trial. In this case, the change of venue is supported by two affidavits, one signed by trial counsel for the defendant, and the other by a secretary employed by a different defense attorney. In reviewing the testimony of potential jurors and balancing it against the request for change of venue, I do not find reversible error.
In addition, I do not believe it was reversible error to allow trial counsel to present an insanity defense. A review of the record does not make it abundantly clear that Jacobs had personal objections to the insanity defense. It should be noted that the trial in this case began on July 5,1989 and preceded this Court’s decision in Dean v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 900 , which was rendered September 28, 1989.
I would affirm the conviction.
SPAIN, J., joins this dissent.