stating that although the plaintiff’s common law tort action for his mesothelioma had been abolished by the WCA, and his claim was time-barred under the WCA, the WCA did not deny access to the courts, it limited the plaintiff’s ability to recover for his claim
How later courts described this case
- stating that although the plaintiff’s common law tort action for his mesothelioma had been abolished by the WCA, and his claim was time-barred under the WCA, the WCA did not deny access to the courts, it limited the plaintiff’s ability to recover for his claim
- holding that temporal limitations to compensation under the WCA and ODA did not alter the exclusive remedy doctrine
- observing that this Court has sometimes been imprecise in its terminology by using terms such as coverage, cognizability, recovery, and relief interchangeably
- asserting without citation that the “catch-all definition [of the ODA] . . . has been viewed as including [mesothelioma]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 623 Pa. 60 (2013)
990 A.2d 801, 804 (Pa. Super. 2010), abrogated on other grounds in Tooey, 81 A.3d 851
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION BY
DONOHUE, J.:
¶ 1 I agree with the result reached by the Majority because we are bound by the opinion of another panel of this Court in Ranalli v. Rohm and Haas Co., 983 A.2d 732 (Pa.Super.2009). I write separately to note that I would not reach Appellants’ argument regarding Article 1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution because Article 3, Section 18 sanctions the statutory exclusive remedy provisions that Appellants challenge as unconstitutional.
¶ 2 Article 3, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides,
The General Assembly may enact laws requiring the payment by employers, or employers and employes jointly, of reasonable compensation for injuries to employes arising in the course of their employment, and for occupational diseases of employes, whether or not such injuries or diseases result in death, and regardless of fault of employer or employe, and fixing the basis of ascertainment of such compensation and the maximum and minimum limits thereof, and providing special or general remedies for the collection thereof; but in no other cases shall the General Assembly limit the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in death, or for injuries to persons or property, and in case of death from such injuries, the right of action shall survive, and the General Assembly shall prescribe for whose benefit such actions shall be prosecuted. No act shall prescribe any limitations of time within which suits may be brought against corporations for injuries to persons or property, or for other causes different from those fixed by general laws regulating actions against natural persons, and such acts now existing are avoided.
Pennsylvania Constitution, Article 3, § 18.
¶ 3 As noted in this Court’s decision in Ranalli , “[i]t is only because of Article 3, Section [18] and the agreement of the parties that the limited recovery in a Workman’s Compensation case is valid.” Ranalli , at ¶ 7 (citing Anderson v. Carnegie Steel Co., 255 Pa. 33, 99 A. 215 (1916)).
¶4 Accordingly, because of Article 3, Section 18, an Article 1, Section 11 analysis is unnecessary. 1
. The Occupational Disease Act, 77 P.S. § 1201 et seq. ("ODA”), like the WCA, gov- *813 ems payment to employees for injuries suffered in the course of employment in exchange for no-fault compensation. Like the Workers’ Compensation Act ("WCA”), the ODA also limits compensation for injuries to that which is provided by statute. Thus, Article 3, Section 18 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, by its terms, applies equally to the WCA and the ODA. See Grosser v. L.E. Smith Glass Co., 95 Pa.Cmwlth. 450 , 505 A.2d 1093, 1096-97 (1986).