stating that “[a] mineral owner, as owner of the dominant 11 estate, has the right to make any use of the surface which is necessarily and reasonably incident to the removal of the minerals.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[a] mineral owner, as owner of the dominant 11 estate, has the right to make any use of the surface which is necessarily and reasonably incident to the removal of the minerals.”
- stating that “[a] mineral owner, as owner of the dominant estate, has the right to make any use of the surface which is necessarily and reasonably incident to the removal of the minerals”
- construing an “oil, gas and other minerals” clause in a lease or deed and citing Heinatz v. Allen, 217 S.W.2d 994, 997 (Tex. 1949)
- overruling Reed v. Wylie, 597 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.1980) and Acker v. Guinn, 464 S.W.2d 348 (Tex.1971) due to the uncertainty in determining title to minerals that resulted from those cases
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RAY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that uranium is a mineral within the ordinary and natural meaning of the word. Also, I agree with the majority that a mineral owner who takes title by an instrument containing an unspecific grant of “oil, gas and other minerals” must compensate the surface owner for the surface destruction caused by the mining of the minerals. I disagree with the majority in that its decision to apply the compensation rule prospectively prevents the Mosers from receiving compensation for the destruction of their surface estate. The rationale underlying the majority’s determination to apply this decision prospectively is based on the public’s reliance on our former holdings and the public’s inability to foresee this change in the law. Neither of these reasons, however, applies to the case at bar. Thus, I would hold that the new compensation rule applies in this case, so that the Mosers'are entitled to compensation from the mineral owners for the destruction of their surface estate.