The opinion
DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge LEADBETTER.
I must respectfully dissent. I believe the majority has read both Driscoll 1 and Bortz 2 too broadly in holding that factual findings of one agency (or, here an arbitrator) cannot have preclusive effect in subsequent proceedings before another agency. As the majority explains, Driscoll involved the issue of preemption, not preclusion. The court rejected the preemption claim, holding that “where a plaintiffs claims of discrimination constitute an unfair labor practice, the claimant has the option of proceeding under either Title VII [and therefore also under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act] or the [National Labor Relations Act].” Driscoll, 525 Pa. at 214, 579 A.2d at 868 (emphasis in original). It did not even say that successive proceedings under both acts were permissible, let alone that in the event of multiple actions the doctrine of issue preclusion would not apply.
In Bortz, the question was whether a finding of willful misconduct in unemploy *669 ment compensation proceedings precluded a Workmen’s Compensation Judge from reinstating disability benefits. The court did not hold the doctrine of preclusion inapplicable, but only that the issue of misconduct was irrelevant “in the workmen’s compensation arena, [where] there is no conduct standard as such. Given this, collateral estoppel does not apply in the instant case because there is no identity of the issues.” Bortz, 546 Pa. at 82, 683 A.2d at 262 (citations omitted).
Here, the majority has thoroughly and accurately demonstrated that all the elements of collateral estoppel/issue preclusion, including identity of issues, have been satisfied. Accordingly, I would hold that the Arbitrator’s factual findings were binding upon the Commission and, therefore, I would reverse.
. Driscoll v. Carpenters Dist. Council of W. Pa., 525 Pa. 205 , 579 A.2d 863 (1990).
. Bortz v. Workmen's Comp. Appeal Bd.(Reznor Div. of FL Indus.), 546 Pa. 77 , 683 A.2d 259 (1996).