"State courts in general have recognized that circumstantial evidence may have equal if not greater weight than direct evidence.”
How later courts described this case
- "State courts in general have recognized that circumstantial evidence may have equal if not greater weight than direct evidence.”
- describing presumption as “a mandatory deduction” and inference as “a permissive deduction”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Taylor, 46 N.J. 316 (1966)
State v. Corby, 28 N.J. 106, 114, 145 A.2d 289 (1958), overruled on other grounds by State v. Taylor, 46 N.J. 316, 217 A.2d 1 (1966).
The opinion
Weiftkaub, C. J.
(concurring). I join in the opinion of Mr. Justice Ebancis except so much as authorizes a trial judge to charge that the inference which a jury may draw is a “strong” one.
I would suppose that if a judge charges that a “strong” inference may be drawn, he would have to add, to respect the jury’s ultimate role, that it may however draw merely *120 an “ordinary,” “mild,” or “weak” one. I am not sure that I comprehend these degrees of inference when the issue is whether a jury may infer that a defendant cannot truthfully deny certain specific facts of the State’s case. It seems to me that a trier of the facts either infers that a defendant cannot make the denial or does not so infer, and that there is no discernible role for the element of strength.
If the trial judge were authorized to express his opinion that the evidence strongly suggests that the jury should draw an unfavorable inference, I could understand the role that would be performed by the word I have italicized. The majority opinion does not authorize a trial judge thus to participate in the process of fact-finding. Yet I suspect that such would be the jurors’ understanding of the charge which the opinion does approve. T could not agree that a trial judge may expressly so charge, and especially because a charge to that effect borders upon a statement that the trial judge believes the defendant to be guilty. We should not forget that the line drawn by our cases between what may be inferred (inability to deny specific facts) and what may not be inferred (guilt) is at best shadowy in its practical effect.
I envision a run of appeals questioning whether the circumstances of each case justified the trial judge’s evaluation of the “strength” of the inference. What I cannot envision is a workable criterion. I assume that the touchstone should not be a judge’s view as to a defendant’s guilt. If this is so, what should the standard be? Unless we can see clearly some workable basis for this refinement, we are better off without it.
Weintraub, C. J., and Heher and Wacheneeld, JJ., concurring in result.
For affirmance—Chief Justice Weintraub, and Justices Heher, Wacheneeld, Burling, Jacobs, Prancis and Proctor—7.
For reversal—None.