holding that “[t]hese clauses reflect a clear intention by the Legislature to apply the old law to prisoners serving a sentence for an offense committed prior to the September 1, 1996, effective date. Thus, the law prior to those revisions applies to applicant, whose offense was committed in 1990.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[t]hese clauses reflect a clear intention by the Legislature to apply the old law to prisoners serving a sentence for an offense committed prior to the September 1, 1996, effective date. Thus, the law prior to those revisions applies to applicant, whose offense was committed in 1990.”
- discussing the legislative rationale for referring to previous convictions in § 508.149 and noting that even "if that holding conviction were not on the list of enumerated offenses, the prisoner would still be ineligible for mandatory supervision if he had previously been convicted of an offense on the list"
- "When an inmate has multiple convictions, he will have one conviction which governs his release date.... It is the conviction that will keep the prisoner in custody for the greatest amount of time."
- outlining the statutory amendments to eligibility for mandatory supervision in Texas
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KELLER, P.J.,
concurring and dissenting
in which HERVEY, J., joined.
I concur in the Court’s opinion regarding the issue of applicant’s eligibility for mandatory supervision, and I agree that applicant is entitled to some “street time” credit on his sentence, but, for the reasons given in my dissent in Ex parte Spann, 1 1 disagree as to the amount of time credit. This opinion is just the first indication of the enormous impact of the Court’s erroneous interpretation of the time credit statute in Spann. The Spann opinion will affect every mandatory-supervision eligible prisoner who is entitled to street time credit. We are just now seeing the tip of the iceberg, as more and more prisoners will receive far more time credit than the Legislature intended to give them.
In this case, for example, applicant receives over two years more time credit than he should. Instead of awarding applicant the 911 days that the Legislature intended to give him, the Court, under Spann, awards him the full 1707 days spent on the street — a difference of 796 days. 2
I respectfully dissent to the amount of time awarded.
. 132 S.W.3d at 396-397(Keller, P.J., dissenting).
. Applicant should earn two days for every day served on the street past the midpoint. Because he had 796 days left upon revocation, the legislative scheme requires him to serve twice that time: 1592 days. Or, to put it in terms of the two-for-one-past-the-midpoint formula: 2503 (remaining time on release) divided by 2 equals 1251.5 (the midpoint). 1707 (time on the street) minus 1251.5 (the midpoint) equals 455.5 (time past the midpoint). Multiplying 455.5 by 2 (two for one past the midpoint) yields 911 (amount of "street time" credit). Subtracting 911 ("street time” credit) from 2503 (time remaining upon release) yields 1592 (days left to serve).