holding that a veteran must be given preference under the non-civil service provision only if he possesses the necessary qualifications for a position as determined by the hiring body
How later courts described this case
- holding that a veteran must be given preference under the non-civil service provision only if he possesses the necessary qualifications for a position as determined by the hiring body
- noting that if the veteran applying for appointment to a position “has the necessary qualifications and is 2/21/20, at 11, 15. Regardless of which type of discrimination is actually alleged, however, Mr. Donahue had the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which he did not do. See Price, 672 A.2d at 413 ; 4 Pa. Code § 105.16 (a). 7 eligible for appointment, he must be given ‘preference’ under the terms of the [Veterans’ Preference A]ct.”
- "[V]eterans are not to be preferred in the assignment of public jobs merely on the strength of being veterans." They must be, in some sense, "qualified."
- appeal from Civil Service Commission Order
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*186 ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of reversal. I agree with the majority that a public employer may establish criteria for employment for particular positions that exceed the minimum certification requirements that might be otherwise established by law, and that these criteria would be the “requisite qualifications” under which the Veteran’s Preference Act, 51 Pa.C.S. § 7104(a), is to be applied. To be meaningful, however, it is necessary that such criteria be clearly spelled out in advance of the selection process, and not merely be subjective conclusions, formed ad hoc dining or after the selection process, based on the relative credentials of the actual applicants. I find no evidence in the record that the school district established such criteria in this case.
Even so, I do not consider it necessary to reach the question of whether the school district was required to give the appel-lee an absolute preference upon receipt of his application. Following the hearing, the board found that the position had, for all intents and purposes, been filled- on July 2, 1990, prior to the appellee’s application on July 10. Although the board had not taken formal action to approve the hiring of the candidate recommended by the Administration Committee on July 2, because no meetings were scheduled until August, the position was considered closed.
Commonwealth Court, treated the Administration Committee’s recommendation to be insufficient, as a matter of law, to close the position, holding that the vacancy was not filled until the board acted in August. The court concluded, therefore, that the appellee’s application had to be considered along with any others submitted before the “advertised deadline.” This analysis ignores a critical finding of fact.
Although the appellee learned of the posting of the position, and its provision that applications could be submitted until July 15, the board found that this, was an internal posting only, pursuant to the contract between the teacher’s union and the district, to allow teachers within the system the opportunity to apply for vacancies prior to their being publicly advertised. The common pleas court held, and I agree, that this finding *187 was supported by substantial evidence. Based on this fact, the appellee’s July 10 application did not “beat the advertised deadline,” since the deadline did not apply to him. Instead, the application was premature. The appellee, despite being aware of the position, would only have been eligible to apply for it if the board had rejected all candidates from within the system and elected to entertain outside applications.
As the common pleas court’s decision affirming the board’s action on this ground was correct, I join in reversing the Commonwealth Court’s order reversing that decision.
GAPPY, J., joins this concurring opinion.