finding plaintiff was subject to two-year statute of limitations for negligence action in legal malpractice claim when counsel had been court-appointed and appellate court “deem[ed] it unrealistic to attempt to confer upon appellant the status of a third party beneficiary to a contract between the Commonwealth and appointed counsel.”
How later courts described this case
- finding plaintiff was subject to two-year statute of limitations for negligence action in legal malpractice claim when counsel had been court-appointed and appellate court “deem[ed] it unrealistic to attempt to confer upon appellant the status of a third party beneficiary to a contract between the Commonwealth and appointed counsel.”
- holding that a plaintiff's false imprisonment action began accruing on the date of his arrest
- “The fact that appellant filed a P.C.H.A. petition in the criminal action alleging ineffective assistance of counsel was entirely inadequate to toll the running of the statute on the civil action.”
- general rule is that statute of limitations for actions alleging negligence of another caused personal injury begins to run from time negligence is done
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately to comment upon the question of what statute of limitations should apply to appellant’s suit against his former court appointed counsel.
The majority concludes that the suit alleges injuries to the person and that a two-year statute of limitations governs the case. I agree.
Appellant filed an answer in response to new matter that had been raised by his former counsel. In his new matter, *273 Mr. Moore’s former attorney indicated some uncertainty as to what was the nature of the complaint. Appellant wrote, “Plaintiff filed a writ of summons which indicated that the action, although inclusive of multiple causes of action, should lie in trespass to the person and personal rights.” Although appellant has represented himself throughout these proceedings and might not be held strictly to our rules, or expected to employ legal terminology correctly, his answer indicates clearly that he intended his action as one for personal injury.
The record provides sufficient basis for our decision, and I would limit our comments to the facts of that record. That is, I would refrain from commenting, as does the majority, that suits against public defenders should not be construed as breach of contract cases. While I agree that this case should not be treated as a contract case, I have not had occasion to consider whether some other malpractice suit against a public defender might allege breach of contract. The issue was not argued or briefed in this case, and I believe that we should refrain from general comment.