The opinion
WIEAND, Judge,
dissenting:
The majority has concluded that the notice requirement contained in the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act of August 14, 1963, P.L. 984, § 36, 66 P.S. 2036, 1 constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is unconstitutional. In order to achieve this result, the author of the lead opinion has employed the intermediate or “heightened scrutiny” level of *523 review. Because I am persuaded by applicable authority that the standard of review utilized is incorrect and because I disagree with the result achieved, I must respectfully, but vigorously, dissent.
William James, the appellant, was injured on May 7, 1975 while descending the subway steps at Fifth and Market Streets in Philadelphia, allegedly as a result of slipping on an old candy wrapper partially coated with chocolate. Suit was instituted against SEPTA by praecipe for summons on May 9, 1977. Answers to SEPTA’s interrogatories and also appellant’s complaint were filed on August 24,1977. Appellant’s attorney died on February 13, 1978, and present counsel entered his appearance on July 24, 1978. SEPTA’s answer contained new matter which alleged the affirmative defense of failure to provide notice as required by Section 36 of the Act of 1963. Appellant’s reply denied that notice was lacking, averring that “[a]s indicated by plaintiff’s answers to interrogatories No. 19, defendant was notified of the accident by Murry Powlen, Esquire in June, 1975. Mr. Powlen died February 13, 1978.” Appellant’s reply also averred that the notice requirement contained in Section 36 of the Act of 1963 was unconstitutional.
Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment on August 22, 1978, contending that the absence of notice constituted a complete bar to appellant’s cause of action. In support thereof, appellee relied upon an affidavit of Elmer Hackett, Jr. which averred that no employee of SEPTA had received notice of appellant's injuries as required by the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act of 1963. Appellant filed an answer to the motion for summary judgment which denied that SEPTA had not been notified, incorporated by reference the answers to interrogatories and objected to the adequacy of the Hackett affidavit. By order dated October 23, 1978, Judge White denied appellee’s motion for summary judgment because the issue of fact concerning notice to SEPTA remained unresolved. The case was referred to a board of arbitration, which, after hearing, entered an award in favor of appellant and against SEPTA for three thousand *524 dollars. An appeal was filed, and the case was listed for trial before the Honorable Joseph P. Braig. On July 27, 1981, Judge Braig held an evidentiary hearing, but the notes of testimony therefrom have not been transcribed. Judge Braig determined that notice had not been given to SEPTA and granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The opinion of the trial court states that summary judgment was entered in favor of appellee because the required notice had not been given. William James filed an appeal from this summary judgment. In doing so he has not challenged the trial court’s finding that notice was not given. His only contention on appeal is that the notice requirement of the Act of 1963 is unconstitutional. His constitutional challenge is based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and also on Article I, Sections 11 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
When reviewing a challenge to the constitutionality of a lawfully enacted statute, this Court must be guided by the well established principle that a statute is cloaked with a strong presumption of constitutionality. The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the legislation “clearly, palpably and plainly violates the Constitution.” Hayes v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 493 Pa. 150, 155 , 425 A.2d 419, 421 (1981) citing Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 393 , 346 A.2d 897, 900 (1975) and Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency, 460 Pa. 1, 16 , 331 A.2d 198, 203 (1975). Accord: Snider v. Thornburgh, 496 Pa. 159, 166 , 436 A.2d 593, 596 (1981); Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 488 Pa. 513, 522 , 412 A.2d 1094, 1099 (1980); Milk Control Commission v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652, 659 , 198 A.2d 840, 843 (1964), appeal dismissed 379 U.S. 3 , 85 S.Ct. 75 , 13 L.Ed.2d 22 (1964); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 234 Pa.Super. 441, 447 , 341 A.2d 184, 186 (1975), aff'd, 476 Pa. 270 , 382 A.2d 715 (1978); Robson v. Penn Hills School District, 63 Pa.Cmwlth. 250, 255 , 437 A.2d 1273, 1276 (1981); In re Street, 67 Pa.Cmwlth. 441, 443 , 447 A.2d 1052, 1054 (1982); Picariello v. Common *525 wealth, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 252, 255 , 421 A.2d 477, 479 (1980); Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Bethlehem Mines Corp., 23 Pa.Cmwlth. 517, 520 , 353 A.2d 79, 80-81 (1976). It is appellant’s contention that Section 36 of the Act of 1963 violated the equal protection clause because it created two classifications of tortfeasors, one consisting solely of metropolitan transportation authorities, and the other including all private individuals or corporations. He contends that this distinction lacked “substantial, rational or reasonable reasons for favoring the governmental tortfeasor with special notice requirements.”
Initially, in any equal protection challenge the correct level of judicial scrutiny must be determined. “[T]here are three tests by which legislatively created classifications are measured in order to determine whether those classifications meet the muster of the Equal Protection Clause. The so-called ‘strict scrutiny test’ is applied to those classifications affecting fundamental rights and liberties, or classifications which are ‘inherently suspect’. See: San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 , 93 S.Ct. 1278 , 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802 , 89 S.Ct. 1404 , 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969). There is an intermediate test which is applied to so-called ‘quasi-suspect’ classifications, such as gender, which requires heightened scrutiny but not scrutiny as intense as that applied in cases involving fundamental rights or inherently suspect classifications. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 , 97 S.Ct. 451 , 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 , 92 S.Ct. 251 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). [citations omitted]. The third test is the ‘rational basis’ or ‘rational relationship’ test. It is applied in those cases not involving fundamental rights, but involving legitimate governmental interests and classifications neither inherently suspect nor quasi-suspect. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 , 90 S.Ct. 1153 , 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).” Long v. 130 Market Street Gift & Novelty of Johnstown, 294 Pa.Super. 383 , 396 n. 9, 440 A.2d 517 , 523 n. 9 (1982). Where, as here, the statute is not based upon a suspect classification and does not interfere *526 with a fundamental right, the “rational basis” test must be employed. Snider v. Thornburgh, supra, 496 Pa. at 167 , 436 A.2d at 596 ; Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, supra 488 Pa. at 523 , 412 A.2d at 1099 ; Commonwealth v. Bottchenbaugh, 306 Pa.Super. 406, 411 , 452 A.2d 789, 791 (1982); Long v. 130 Market Street Gift & Novelty of Johnstown, supra 294 Pa.Super. at 402 , 440 A.2d at 527 . Accord: Schroeder Aviation, Inc. v. DeFehr, 283 N.W.2d 147, 152 (N.D., 1979); Brown v. Wichita State University, 219 Kan. 2, 16 , 547 P.2d 1015, 1027 (1976) appeal dismissed 429 U.S. 806 , 97 S.Ct. 41 , 50 L.Ed.2d 67 (1976); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 713 , 535 P.2d 1348, 1350-1351 (1975), appeal dismissed sub nom Agost v. Idaho, 423 U.S. 993 , 96 S.Ct. 419 , 46 L.Ed.2d 367 (1975). Under this level of scrutiny, in order to withstand constitutional challenge, the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and rest upon a difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 , 40 S.Ct. 560, 561 , 64 L.Ed. 989, 990-991 (1920); Snider v. Thornburgh, supra 496 Pa. at 167 , 436 A.2d at 597 ; Laudenberger v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 496 Pa. 52, 68 , 436 A.2d 147, 155 (1981), appeal dismissed sub nom Bucheit v. Laudenberger, 456 U.S. 940 , 102 S.Ct. 2002 , 72 L.Ed.2d 462 (1982); Hayes v. Erie Insurance Exchange, supra 493 Pa. at 156 , 425 A.2d at 422 ; Kroger Company v. O’Hara Township, 481 Pa. 101, 119 , 392 A.2d 266, 275 (1978); Moyer v. Phillips, 462 Pa. 395, 400-401 , 341 A.2d 441, 443 (1975).
Appellant’s argument that the notice requirement of Section 36 of the Act of 1963 is constitutionally infirm because it creates two classes of tortfeasors, based solely upon the status of the tortfeasor, is without merit. “ ‘[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objec *527 tive. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ ” Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., supra 234 Pa.Super. at 447 , 341 A.2d at 187 quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-426 , 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). Accord: Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 75 , 92 S.Ct. at 253 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971); Hayes v. Erie Insurance Exchange, supra 493 Pa. at 155 , 425 A.2d at 422 ; Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, supra 488 Pa. at 522 , 412 A.2d at 1098-1099 ; Kroger Company v. O’Hara Township, supra 481 Pa. at 118-119 , 392 A.2d at 275 ; Adler v. Montefiore Hospital Association of Western Pennsylvania, 453 Pa. 60, 76-77 , 311 A.2d 634, 643 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1131 , 94 S.Ct. 870 , 38 L.Ed.2d 755 (1974); Commonwealth v. Bottchenbaugh, supra 306 Pa.Super. at 412 , 452 A.2d at 791 . Thus, the law is quite well established and clear “that the Legislature may permissibly limit liability on the basis of a defendant’s status.” Carroll v. County of York, 496 Pa. 363, 368 , 437 A.2d 394, 397 (1981) citing Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270 , 382 A.2d 715 (1978) and Sherwood v. Elgart, 383 Pa. 110 , 117 A.2d 899 (1955). Accord: Marino v. Seneca Homes, Inc., 63 Pa. Cmwlth. 534, 541, 439 A.2d 1287, 1291 (1981); Picariello v. Commonwealth, supra 54 Pa.Cmwlth. at 257-258 , 421 A.2d at 482 .
The classification challenged by appellant, i.e., all metropolitan transportation authority tortfeasors, is a classification based upon a legitimate state objective of furthering and improving urban mass transportation. In furtherance of this goal, the legislature has imposed upon persons injured by transportation authorities a duty to notify promptly agencies against whom claims are to be made. This is a reasonable restriction upon the right to recover. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “it is within the province of the Legislature to determine that certain *528 bars to suit are, in its judgment, needed for the operation of local government.” Carroll v. County of York, supra 496 Pa. at 370, 437 A.2d at 397 . (footnote omitted). Therefore, if the statutory classification of all metropolitan transportation authority tortfeasors is rationally related to the legislature’s objective in enacting the statute, it is a constitutionally permissive classification and must be upheld.
Section 2 of the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act of 1963 contained the declaration of legislative public policy with regard to the establishment of transportation authorities under the Act, and provided in part:
“It is hereby determined and declared as a matter of legislative finding: (a) That there exists in the urban and suburban communities in metropolitan areas, traffic congestion and serious mass transportation problems because of underdeveloped, uncoordinated obsolete mass transportation facilities____ (b) ... harmful to the social and economic well-being of the entire area____ (c) That ... cannot be effectively dealt with by private enterprise — (d) ... that the public acquisition of existing mass transportation facilities ... will promote the public health, safety, convenience and welfare____ (g) That the establishment of metropolitan transportation authorities will promote the public safety, convenience and welfare
Therefore, it is hereby declared to be. the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to promote the safety and welfare of the inhabitants thereof by authorizing the creation of a body corporate and politic for each metropolitan area, ... for the purposes contained in this act. Such purposes are hereby declared to be public uses____■” 66 P.S. § 2002.
While the Act of 1963 did not expressly discuss the purpose of the notice requirement, this Court has previously held that the purpose of Section 36 of the Act of 1963 is to “provide the defendant with the opportunity to make timely investigation and avoid the difficulty of defending against stale and fraudulent claims.” Dubin v. Southeastern *529 Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 219 Pa.Super. 476, 478 , 281 A.2d 711, 712 (1971), allocatur denied, 219 Pa.Super. XXXVII (1972). Accord: Irrera v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 231 Pa.Super. 508, 518 , 331 A.2d 705, 710 (1974).
A similar notice requirement for claims against municipalities contained in the Act of July 1, 1937, P.L. 2547, § 1, 53 P.S. § 5301 2 withstood constitutional challenge in Eisenhauer v. Cleveland, Township, 154 Pa.Super. 206, 215 , 35 A.2d 570, 574 (1944). Early notice has been recognized as a legitimate means “by which municipal governments might protect themselves against claims of those who have tarried so long that they have made it insurmountably difficult for the municipality to conduct a proper investigation into the circumstances of the accident.” Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, 430 Pa. 325, 332-333 , 243 A.2d 372, 377 (1968). Accord: Zack v. Saxonburg Borough, 386 Pa. 463, 465 , 126 A.2d 753, 754 (1956); Aloia v. City of Washington, 361 Pa. 620, 624 , 65 A.2d 685, 687 (1949); Landis v. City of Philadelphia, 245 Pa.Super. 514, 518-519 , 369 A.2d 746, 748 (1976). See also: LaBriola v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 227 Pa.Super. 305 , 323 A.2d 9 (1974). 3
Courts of other jurisdictions have also recognized that valid purposes are served by similar notice requirements and include: “(1) to investigate evidence while fresh; (2) to prepare a defense in case litigation appears necessary; (3) to evaluate claims, allowing early settlement of meritorious *530 ones; (4) to protect against unreasonable or nuisance claims; (5) to facilitate prompt repairs, avoiding further injuries; (6) to allow the municipality [or agency] to budget for payment of claims; and (7) to insure that officials responsible for the above tasks are aware of their duty to act.” Budahl v. Gordon & David Associates, 287 N.W.2d 489, 492 (S.D., 1980). Accord: Newlan v. State, supra, 96 Idaho at 714 , 535 P.2d at 1351-1352 ; Fuller v. Rutgers, the State University, 154 N.J.Super. 420, 424 , 381 A.2d 811, 814 (1977); Stanley v. City and County of San Francisco, 48 Cal.App.3d 575, 580 , 121 Cal.Rptr. 842, 846 (1975). See also: Anno., Modern Status of the Law as to Validity of Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Notice of Tort Claim Against Local Governmental Entity, 59 A.L.R.3d 93 (1974).
The lead opinion cites decisions from four jurisdictions which have held that notice requirements applicable only to governmental tortfeasors violate the equal protection clause. 4 In reaching such a conclusion, however, the courts in all four jurisdictions noted that in their respective states, the defense of sovereign immunity was not available to the tortfeasors named as defendants. See: O’Neil v. Parkersburg, 237 S.E.2d 504, 507 (W.Va.1977); Hunter v. North Mason High School, 85 Wash.2d 810, 817 , 539 P.2d 845, 850 (1975); Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230 , 510 P.2d 879, 881 (Nev.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1079 , 94 S.Ct. 598 , 38 L.Ed.2d 486 (1973); Reich v. State Highway Department, 386 Mich. 617, 622 , 194 N.W.2d 700, 702 (1972). The vast majority of courts, however, have held that notice requirements, some as short as thirty days, do not violate principles of equal protection, especially where sovereign immunity is a recognized defense. See: DeAlmanza v. Laredo Water Works System, 582 F.2d 970 (5th Cir.1978) (applying Texas law); Oquendo v. Insurance Company of Puerto Rico, 388 F.Supp. 1030 (D.C.Puerto Rico 1974); Budahl v. Gordon & David Associates, supra; Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979); Schroeder Aviation, Inc. *531 v. DeFehr, supra; Parton v. City of Huntsville, 362 So.2d 898 (Ala.1978); Fritz v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 196 Colo. 335 , 586 P.2d 23 (1978); Espanola Housing Authority v. Atencio, 90 N.M. 787 , 568 P.2d 1233 (1977); Fujimura v. Chicago Transit Authority, 67 Ill.2d 506 , 10 Ill.Dec. 619 , 368 N.E.2d 105 (1977); Geyer v. The City of Logansport, 267 Ind. 334 , 370 N.E.2d 333 (Indiana 1977); Binder v. City of Madison, 72 Wis.2d 613 , 241 N.W.2d 613 (1976); Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 (Utah 1976); Campbell v. The City of Lincoln, 195 Neb. 703 , 240 N.W.2d 339 (1976); Newlan v. State, supra; Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97 (Wyo.1975); Tessier v. Ann & Hope Factory Outlet, Inc., 114 R.I. 315 , 332 A.2d 781 (1975); Wilson v. District of Columbia, 338 A.2d 437 (D.C.Ct.App.1975); Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1973); Housewright v. The City of LaHarpe, 51 Ill.2d 357 , 282 N.E.2d 437 (1972); Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27 , 492 P.2d 1335 (1972); Workman v. The City of Emporia, 200 Kan. 112 , 434 P.2d 846 (1967); McCann v. The City of Lake Wales, 144 So.2d 505 (Fla.1962); Brown v. Portland School District No. 1, 48 Or.App. 571 , 617 P.2d 665 (1980); Fuller v. Rutgers, the State University, supra; Pausley v. Chaloner, 54 App.Div.2d 131, 388 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1976); Brantley v. The City of Dallas, 498 S.W.2d 452 (Tex.Civ.App.1973), error ref. n.r.e., cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 , 94 S.Ct. 1576 , 39 L.Ed.2d 880 (1974).
It seems apparent, therefore, that well settled principles of law and the precedent established by prior decisions require that appellant’s constitutional argument be rejected. I confess to an inability to understand why the majority, despite a wealth of legal authority to the contrary, is prepared to depart from the mainstream of legal thought and, in effect, nullify all municipal notice requirements enacted by the legislature as a prerequisite to judicial enforcement of tort claims against municipal bodies. The argument made by appellant and cited by the lead opinion that the notice requirement falls most heavily on the poor is an argument “grounded not on constitutional precepts, but *532 on social policies. As such, they must be addressed to the legislature, and not to the courts.” Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, supra 488 Pa. at 523 , 412 A.2d at 1099 .
Appellant’s contentions that Section 36 of the Act of 1963 violates Article I, Sections 11 and 26 of the Pennsylvania Constitution are equally lacking in merit. The Supreme Court, in Carroll, v. County of York, supra, has already held that Article I, Section 11 5 was “ ‘intended to allow the Legislature if it desired, to choose cases in which the Commonwealth should be. immune____’” Id. 496 Pa. at 367, 437 A.2d at 396 quoting Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 400 , 388 A.2d 709, 717 (1978). Thus, the Legislature could validly abolish a cause of action against the Commonwealth, and the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act 6 is a valid exercise of legislative authority and not violative of Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See also: Tsarnas v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, supra 488 Pa. at 518-520 , 412 A.2d at 1096-1097 . If the Legislature can validly abolish a cause of action against the Commonwealth, it follows that it can impose procedural conditions for maintaining an action against an agency or instrumentality of the state. See also: Freeze Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Company, supra 476 Pa. at 280-281 , 382 A.2d at 720-721 ; Singer v. Sheppard, 464 Pa. 387, 400 , 346 A.2d 897, 903-904 (1975) (plurality opinion).
*533 Section 26 of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides: “Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right.” The notice requirement of Section 36 of the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act of 1963 did not deny appellant the enjoyment of any civil right. Rather, it created an obligation to give notice to a metropolitan transportation authority before commencing a legal action for damages against such authority. If we were to conclude that Section 36 of the Act of 1963 violated Article I, Section 26 of the Constitution, we would be obliged to hold that statutes of limitation applicable to actions against governmental agencies also violate Section 26 of Article I. This is clearly not the purpose of the guarantee contained in this section of the Constitution. See and compare: Astemborski v. Susmarski, 499 Pa. 99 , 451 A.2d 1012 (1982).
For the foregoing reasons, I would find that the statutory provision was valid and would affirm the order of the trial court entering summary judgment in favor of the appellee.
. The Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act of 1963 was repealed by Section 2 of the Judiciary Act Repealer Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 2(a) [1371]. The notice requirement for claims against metropolitan transportation authorities is not contained in the Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142, § 221(i)(l); 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522(a) which provides, inter alia:
(a) Notice prerequisite to action against government unit.—
(1) Within six months from the date that any injury was sustained or any cause of action accrued, any person who is about to commence any civil action or proceeding within this Commonwealth or elsewhere against a government unit for damages on account of any injury to his person or property under Chapter 85 (relating to matters affecting government units) or otherwise shall file in the office of the government unit, and if the action is against a Commonwealth agency for damages, then also file in the office of the Attorney General, a statement in writing, signed by or in his behalf, setting forth:
(i) The name and residence address of the person to whom the cause of action has accrued.
(ii) The name and residence address of the person injured.
(iii) The date and hour of the accident.
(iv) The approximate location where the accident occurred.
(v) The name and residence or office address of any attending physician.
. Repealed by Section 2 of the Judiciary Act Repealer Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53, § 2(a) [1205]. The notice requirement for claims against municipalities is now provided for by the Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142, § 221(i)(l); 42 Pa.C.S. § 5522.
. In recognition of statutory purposes and objectives, courts have permitted plaintiffs to pursue causes of action even in the absence of compliance with the notice requirements of the Acts of 1963 and 1937, where the defendants would not be unduly prejudiced. See: Yurechko v. County of Allegheny, supra; Landis v. City of Philadelphia, supra; LaBriola v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, supra; Dubin v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, supra.
. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925 , 424 A.2d 825 (N.H.1980) involved a notice requirement applicable to medical malpractice actions, not actions against governmental tortfeasors.
. Article I, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
"All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the Commonwealth in such manner, in such courts and in such cases as the Legislature may by law direct.”
. Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1399, 53 P.S. §§ 5311.101-5311.803, repealed by Section 333 of the Judiciary Act Repealer Act, Continuation Act of 1980, Act of October 5, 1980, P.L. 693, 42 P.S. § 20043. A similar provision is now found in the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8564.