stating that “there must be proof or evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the purpose of the delay was to extort a more favorable settlement or to deceive the insured with respect to the applicable coverage”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “there must be proof or evidence supporting a reasonable inference that the purpose of the delay was to extort a more favorable settlement or to deceive the insured with respect to the applicable coverage”
- holding that the testimony of a structured settlement specialist was alone sufficient to create a jury issue as to whether automobile insurers and an accident victim had reached a settlement
- explaining that “[i]t has long been the law [in Kentucky] that the fact that a compromise agreement is verbal and not yet reduced to writing does not make it any less binding”
- cautioning that, although the “UCSPA does not require that a claim be evaluated, or that it be evaluated correctly,” it does require “that a good faith attempt be made to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled implicitly by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Marley, 2004 Ky. LEXIS 326 (2004)
The Court of Appeals panel agreed with that analysis and opined that Marley implicitly overruled Glass and the Court of Appeals cases relying on Glass.
Abrogated on other grounds by Hollaway v. Direct General Insurance Co. of Mississippi, 2016 Ky. LEXIS 433 (2016)
996 S.W.2d 437, 445 (Ky. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Hollaway v. Direct General Insurance Co. of Mississippi, Inc., 497 S.W.3d 733
The opinion
LAMBERT, Chief Justice,
Supplemental Dissenting.
Rehearing was granted herein on certain issues and the case was re-argued. Thereafter, the majority opinion was modified and this supplemental dissenting opinion is filed in response to modifications contained in the majority opinion. In all other respects, I reiterate the views expressed in my dissenting opinion filed herein on October 30,1997.
In my view, the evidence presented at trial was decidedly conflicting on the issue of Joel Depp’s informed, good faith evaluation of the Jeffrey Glass claim. After hearing all the evidence, the trial court believed the case should be submitted to the jury for its verdict on this issue, and the jury returned a verdict for Glass on the belief that Depp had violated the UCS-PA, KRS 304.12-230, warranting compensatory damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Despite the foregoing and despite our duty to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed at trial (Lewis v. Bledsoe Surface Mining Co., Ky., 798 S.W.2d 459, 461 (1990), and NCAA v. Hornung, Ky., 754 *464 S.W.2d 855, 860 (1988)), this Court has reconsidered the evidence and concluded that neither the facts nor the law allow Glass to prevail. From this view, I dissent and will endeavor to demonstrate the error in the majority opinion.
The crucial factual question was whether Depp evaluated, properly or at all, the Glass claim, for purposes of settlement. Depp testified that he made such an evaluation but acknowledged that it was not recorded in the claim file. In deposition testimony and at trial, Depp also admitted that his claimed evaluation was based on woefully inadequate medical records and that vast sums of additional medical expenses had been incurred since his file had been updated. Moreover, there was no written analysis of comparative fault and after admitting that company policy required a written evaluation, Depp acknowledged his violation of such policy. Based on the testimony of Joel Depp, a jury could have reasonably believed, and indeed did believe, the theory that Depp, on behalf of Farm Bureau, had simply handed the claim over to Hackney, a structured settlement salesman, and had therefore abrogated his responsibility to evaluate the claim.
The UCSPA denounces as unfair claims settlement practices “Refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available information” and “Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear KRS 304.12-280(4), (6). Despite this language and the mandate of KRS 446.080 that statutes of this state be liberally construed to carry out the intent of the Legislature, the majority has held that the statute does not require an evaluation: “The UCSPA does not require that a claim be evaluated or that it be evaluated correctly.” Slip op. 37. While it is true that the exact text of the statute does not use the term “evaluation,” any reasonable construction of the statute would imply the necessity of an informal evaluation prior to any possible compliance with the literal statutory requirements.
In my view the revised analysis on page 38 of the majority opinion amounts to a concession that the facts were in dispute, but shifts the focus to the law and concludes that whether or not Depp failed to evaluate the claim, there could be no violation of the Act. Such a strict construction eviscerates the Act.
STUMBO and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this supplemental dissenting opinion.