recognizing brief stay in eviction proceedings to allow additional time for disabled tenant to conduct cleaning could constitute a reasonable accommodation
How later courts described this case
- recognizing brief stay in eviction proceedings to allow additional time for disabled tenant to conduct cleaning could constitute a reasonable accommodation
- explaining how failure-to- accommodate claims differ from disparate treatment and disparate impact claims
- "The District of Columbia Human Rights Act employs virtually the same language as that found in the federal Fair Housing Act, substituting the word 'disability’ for ‘handicap’ while incorporating verbatim the federal wording for discrimination based on ‘a refusal to make reasonable accommodations’ for the disabled.”
- “[A] reasonable accommodation defense will be timely until the proverbial last minute.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FARRELL, Associate Judge,
with whom TERRY, Associate Judge, joins, concurring:
I join the court’s opinion because it impressively and correctly resolves issues arising at the intersection of this jurisdiction’s landlord and tenant law and the federal Fair Housing Act, and because I understand it to hold, on the ultimate issue of reasonable accommodation under the Act, just what it states in Part V: that rejection of the tenant’s discrimination defense as a matter of law was premature, and that a remand of the case is necessary “to permit the tenant to show, by affidavit or similar proffer, that triable issues of fact remain as to whether her mental impairment can be accommodated in a manner consistent with the health and safety of the other tenants.” Ante at 1144. The tenant has not yet made, and has not had sufficient opportunity to make, that showing because, as the court explains, “the trial court focused primarily on issues at the pretrial hearing that led to erroneous rulings against the tenant on grounds other than the reasonableness of the requested accommodation.” Ante at 1138. I refer in particular to the trial court’s conclusions that the requested accommodation was untimely, was made legally irrelevant by the health and safety exception, and failed of proof from the lack of high quality expert testimony. Because these rulings could well have operated to prevent further inquiry into whether a stay of eviction and services by the District of Columbia such as the tenant — in broad terms — had proposed would be a reasonable accommodation of her disability, the court is correct that “the tenant must be allowed to proffer her reasonable accommodation defense anew for trial court consideration.” Ante at 1138. For that defense to be worthy of jury consideration, however, it will have to come with flesh on the bones that it so far does not have. Unless the tenant can offer concrete and specific assurances by the District regarding its willingness to assist her in maintaining the apartment in a clean and safe condition, the trial court will be entitled to reject the defense of reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.