holding that a trial court properly denied a directed verdict in a case involving both sodomy and sexual abuse because "[i]t was within the province of the jury to determine by method of reasonable inference whether the situation described here amounted to sexual contact.... The fact that Bills had previously made sexual advances toward the victim in Lexington indicates that he was acting for the purpose of sexual gratification.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a trial court properly denied a directed verdict in a case involving both sodomy and sexual abuse because "[i]t was within the province of the jury to determine by method of reasonable inference whether the situation described here amounted to sexual contact.... The fact that Bills had previously made sexual advances toward the victim in Lexington indicates that he was acting for the purpose of sexual gratification.”
- explaining that, in most circumstances, the sexual organs would be considered an “intimate part,” even if touched over the clothes of the victim, and that the leg would also be considered to be an “intimate part” of the body, assuming the other two factors are satisfied
- "The removal of the victim’s clothing was unnecessary in regard to the sex act involving oral sodomy. The two acts did not merge even though they may have occurred close in time. The contact was not incidental but rather related to sexual gratification.”
- in closing remarks, “the prosecutor may draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence and announce his own theory to explain the evidence and why it supports the guilt of the defendant[]”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LAMBERT, Justice,
concurring.
I wrote a dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Lundergan, Ky., 847 S.W.2d 729 (rendered February 18, 1993), and concluded that the “rule of lenity” was without any application. I have reached a similar conclusion in this case and for that and other reasons, have joined the majority opinion and declined to join Justice Leib-son’s dissenting opinion.
Despite the foregoing, I agree with Justice Leibson that this Court has engaged in an inconsistent application of the rule of lenity. The logical underpinning for the opinions in Lundergan are as applicable here as there, but the result is different. While the cases differ in that one involved a political crime while the other was a *474 vicious sex crime, the rule of law should be the same.