Opinion

Caporale v. C. W. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc.

  • 149 Conn. 79
  • 175 A.2d 561
  • 1961 Conn. LEXIS 259
Court
Supreme Court of Connecticut
Filed
Nov 21, 1961
Status
Published
Author
Murphy
On the bench
Murphy, Baldwin, King, Mubphy, Alcokn
Cited by
65 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.1%

stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged

How later courts described this case

  • stressing that courts must review the circumstances and conditions surrounding the activity, and noting that the pile driving in that case occurred within seventy-five feet of the building that was damaged
  • holding that use of a pile driver capable of delivering 15,000 foot-pounds of energy was intrinsically dangerous.
  • holding that pile driving is an ultrahazardous activity
  • imposing strict liability for damage caused by pile-driver operation

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Murphy, J.

(concurring). Had the opinion sustained the judgment on the count alleging nuisance, I could agree, since there is no doubt in my mind that the damage to Caporale’s buildings was caused *87 by the defendant’s pile driving operations. I am willing to concede, however, that a rather hairsplitting distinction would be required to sustain the judgment on the nuisance count, since the plaintiffs consented to judgment for the defendant on the count alleging negligence and have thus eliminated liability on the theory of nuisance arising from negligence. Although it may be difficult to spell out an absolute nuisance, as distinguished from one arising from negligence, I feel that under the rule of Beckwith v. Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 509 , 29 A.2d 775 , and cases cited therein, an absolute nuisance could be found. Parenthetically, it may be noted that if the count in negligence had remained, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would have applied. Briganti v. Connecticut Co., 119 Conn. 316, 320 , 175 A. 679 ; see Bonczkiewicz v. Merberg Wrecking Corporation, 148 Conn. 573, 579 , 172 A.2d 917 .

In Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515, 518 , 165 A. 352 , we said that “[a]n automobile, while capable of doing great injury when not properly operated upon the highways, is not an intrinsically dangerous instrumentality to be classed with ferocious animals or high explosives.” I cannot conceive that a pile driver is any more dangerous than some of the high-powered cars and gargantuan tractor-trailers that infest our roads today. An inherently or intrinsically dangerous work is work that is necessarily attendant with danger no matter how skilfully or carefully it is performed. Janice v. State, 201 Misc. 915, 920 , 107 N.Y.S.2d 674 ; Wright v. Phoenix Utility Co., 198 N.C. 204, 206 , 151 S.E. 241 . The effect of the majority opinion is to impose absolute liability, that is, liability without fault, whenever a pile driver is used. See Whitman Hotel *88 Corporation v. Elliott & Watrous Engineering Co., 137 Conn. 562, 576 , 79 A.2d 591 (concurring opinion). I do not feel that a pile driver is intrinsically dangerous.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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