Opinion

Commonwealth v. Pierce

  • 567 Pa. 186
  • 786 A.2d 203
  • 2001 Pa. LEXIS 2703
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Dec 21, 2001
Status
Published
Author
Castille
On the bench
Flaherty, Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor
Cited by
355 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.1%

Abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 (2002)

stating that in order to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, an appellant must demonstrate that the underlying claim is of arguable merit

How later courts described this case

  • stating that in order to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim, an appellant must demonstrate that the underlying claim is of arguable merit
  • stating that “[ajbsent demonstration of prejudice, [a defendant] cannot prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and no further inquiry into the claim is warranted”
  • stating that "[a]bsent demonstration of prejudice, [a defendant] cannot prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel and no further inquiry into the claim is warranted"
  • articulating that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must show that (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel’s performance lacked a reasonable basis; and (3) the ineffectiveness of counsel caused the petitioner prejudice

Written by the judges who cited it.

Later courts went against this

  • Abrogated on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 (2002)

    786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 2001), abrogated on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726
    Supreme Court of PennsylvaniaDec 31, 200230 citing opinionsother groundsRead it

The opinion

CONCURRING OPINION

CASTILLE, Justice.

I join the majority opinion. I write separately only to further address appellant’s claims that his direct appeal counsel was ineffective.

As the majority notes, appellant’s claims of trial court error, as well as his claims alleging that trial counsel was ineffective, are waived under the PCRA since appellant, who was represented by counsel other than trial counsel on post-verdict motions and direct appeal, could have raised these claims on that appeal. Thus, the only claims available to appellant on this pro se appeal are his “layered” claims sounding in ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel, as well as his claims alleging that PCRA counsel was ineffective. In my recent concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Williams, 782 A.2d 517 (Pa.2001), I addressed at some length the “substantive contours of claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness.” Id. at 534-37 (Castille, J. concurring). Here, the majority properly concludes that appellant’s underlying claims lack substantive merit. Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise these meritless claims in addition to, or instead of, the claims counsel forwarded to this Court. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 538 Pa. 455 , 649 A.2d 121, 128 (1994), cert. denied, Peterkin v. Pennsylvania, 515 U.S. 1137 , 115 S.Ct. 2569 , 132 L.Ed.2d 821 (1995); Commonwealth v. Tarver, 491 Pa. 253 , 420 A.2d 438, 438 (1980). Accordingly, I join fully in the majority’s determination that appellant is not entitled to PCRA relief.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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