Possible need of self-defense did not justify conduct of taking law into own hands simply because individual wished to right what he “apparently considered a grievous personal wrong.”
How later courts described this case
- Possible need of self-defense did not justify conduct of taking law into own hands simply because individual wished to right what he “apparently considered a grievous personal wrong.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
While I agree with the majority’s discussion of our scope of review of a decision of the Civil Service Commission *34 (Commission), I must take issue with the application of these principles. As the majority correctly states, it is the duty of the Commission to make a record of the proceedings and determine findings of fact. Our function is limited to determining whether the Commission committed an error of law, abused its discretion, or entered a decision unsupported by substantial evidence. Williams v. Civil Service Commission, 457 Pa. 470 , 327 A.2d 70 (1974); Foley v. Civil Service Commission of the City of Philadelphia, 55 Pa. Cmwlth. 594, 423 A.2d 1351 (1980). See also Local Agency Law, 2 Pa.C.S. § 754(b). Failing to meet this criteria we are bound to adopt the adjudication of the Commission.
The majority has concluded that “[t]he Commission ignored the evidence and admissions on what happened after the shooting and avoided any specific findings of fact on the post-shooting events.” (At 30). With this conclusion I cannot agree. It is clear that part of the record before the Commission included the transcripts of both.hearings before the Fire Trial Board. Furthermore, during the Commission hearing, the Appellee testified that he did not call the police or medical assistance because upon exiting the house, he heard that someone else was summoning them and shortly thereafter heard sirens. Clearly, the issue was raised and considered by the Commission. Contrary to the majority’s Opinion, the Commission decided to believe the Appellee and determined that his conduct after the shooting did not demonstrate conduct unbecoming of an officer.
Furthermore, the majority holds that the record supports the conclusion that as a matter of law, the Appellee’s conduct was conduct unbecoming of an officer. In so holding, the majority relies upon certain facts of record. The majority concludes that the Appellee’s decision to engage in self-help to retrieve his stolen property belittled the position of firemen. The record before the Commission indicates that the Appellee had no intention of taking the law into his own hands. Instead, the Appellee first requested police assistance to retrieve his stolen property, only to be rebuffed. It was only then that the Appellee attempted to secure his stolen items. At no time does the record *35 reflect any intention to inflict retribution against the thieves. Furthermore, both at the criminal trial and at the Commission hearing, the Appellee testified that he was attacked while in the house and that the subsequent shooting was an accident.
Although I might reach a different conclusion than the Commission, if given the opportunity to observe the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, under the law I must defer to its determination provided it is supported by substantial evidence. Based upon the foregoing, I cannot say as a matter of law that the Appellee’s conduct was unbecoming of an officer and must therefore dissent from the majority Opinion. 1
. In reviewing this record, I found the City Solicitor’s position in this case quite disturbing. In particular, I disagree with the prosecutorial rule he adopted, thereby effectively leaving the Fire Trial Board without legal counsel. If the Solicitor intends to continue as a quasi prosecutor, then the City better provide special legislation to provide a legal advisor for the Fire Trial Board. Furthermore, I must comment on a second peculiarity with this appeal. Although the Appellant now expresses deep concern about the Appellee’s conduct after the shooting, such was not the case at the second Fire Trial Board hearing. At that hearing, the City was concerned only with the issue of back pay. Apparently, the issue of the Appellee’s post-shooting actions only surfaced during the arguments before the Commonwealth Court.