finding Mount Laurel doctrine only applied to developing municipalities when considering challenge to zoning ordinance in “fully developed, predominantly single-family residential community”
How later courts described this case
- finding Mount Laurel doctrine only applied to developing municipalities when considering challenge to zoning ordinance in “fully developed, predominantly single-family residential community”
- referring to “sound and long established principles concerning judicial respect for local policy decisions in the zoning field”
- 6 Justices + 1 judge temporarily assigned
- judicial branch is not suited to the role of an ad hoc super zoning legislature
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Sullivan, J.
(concurring). I am in general agreement that this is not a Mount Laurel case for two reasons. First, the Township of Washington is not a developing municipality. Second, the proposed housing is not for low or moderate income families. The trial judge, while he properly struck down the 1967 amendment to the zoning ordinance which increased the minimum lot requirements of the property in question from 10,000 square feet to two acres, unnecessarily became enmeshed in rezoning in order to allow for multi-family housing on plaintiff Waldy’s 30-aere tract of land.
I recognize that where there is a need for a particular type of conventional housing in an area, such as multi-family housing, a municipality in that area has some obligation *493 as to that need, provided it has land available and suitable for such use, and provided its overall zone plan and the public good are not adversely affected to a substantial extent. This is so even though, as here, the municipality may be largely developed on a single-family residence basis with only 2.3% of its area remaining vacant land. The solution lies in meaningful utilization of the statutory special exception or variance processes. Indeed, I would hold that a demonstrated need for a particular type of conventional housing would constitute a special reason authorizing the grant of a variance, provided the negative criteria of the statute are satisfied. 1
This case points up the inherent weakness in the present statutory provisions which, with few exceptions, vest exclusive control over zoning in the particular municipal government. Paseack Valley is a typical example. There is an admitted need for multi-family housing in this area yet five of the eight municipalities in the Valley do not permit this type of housing unit. However, if you consider each one of these municipalities separately, some basis can be demonstrated for the particular zone plan. Until regional zoning is established based on comprehensive planning, the problems we are now grappling with cannot be resolved except on an ad hoc basis.
I am constrained to add the following. Our decision in Mount Laurel and its progeny admittedly deal with difficult and far-reaching problems involving the public welfare. I wonder, though, if the opinions we are handing down in this area of the law of zoning have not become so complicated that they are beyond the comprehension of the average member of a local planning board, board of adjustment or governing body (not to mention many members of the bench and bar). In directing local government as to how *494 it must exercise its zoning power pursuant to law, it is essential that we speak with more clarity, directness and simplicity.
I join in the modification of the Appellate Division judgment and the affirmance of that judgment as modified.
An application for a variance was made in this case. However, it was ultimately denied and this decision was not appealed by plaintiffs.