The opinion
ROBSON, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
For the reasons set forth below, I am of the opinion that the challenged provisions of the Illinois Financial Responsibility Law are unconstitutional. Since these provisions are thoroughly described in the majority opinion, I shall restrict my discussion to the issue of constitutionality.
All of the representative plaintiffs or their automobiles were involved in accidents in which another motorist filed a report claiming injury or damages exceeding $100. None of the plaintiffs were ever adjudged liable for damages arising out of the accidents which were the cause of recovation of their driver’s licenses or motor vehicle registrations. Police reports concerning the accidents of four of the plaintiffs indicate unequivocally that they or persons driving their ears were the victims of the accidents, while the claimants were actually at fault. All plaintiffs were required by the defendants to post security in amounts varying from $600 to $2,300, and were required to purchase financial responsibility insurance in compliance with the challenged provisions. The arbitrariness of the required security de-. posits is well demonstrated by two plaintiffs before this court. The plaintiff Sarah Taylor was required to post $2,-300 security, although she was subsequently sued by the claimant for only $740. The plaintiff Harold Witt was required to post $850 security, although he later sued the claimant and received a $700 settlement. 1 Inability to produce the necessary funds resulted in the revocations of driver’s licenses and motor vehicle registrations in issue here. The plaintiffs allege that they have suffered irreparable harm because of their consequent loss of mobility. The character of such harm varies from inability to continue in established employment requiring mobility to impairment of family recreational activities. It is undisputed that requests by the plaintiffs for hearings have been ignored or informally denied by the defendants. The defendants’ decisions concerning the revocations in issue were made ex parte and were based solely upon the unverified accident reports of other motorists.
In this era of great mobility, driver’s licenses and vehicle registrations are undeniably valuable interests. The importance of the right to own and operate an automobile to contemporary health, welfare and economic pursuits of life, and the constitutional necessity of a hearing and other procedural safeguards before revocation of this right, have been specifically recognized in recent years. Schecter v. Killingsworth, 93 Ariz. 273 , 380 P.2d 136, 140 (1963); People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210 , 363 P.2d 180 *1355 (1961); Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435 , 103 N.E.2d 728 (1952).
Certainly the State may enact licensing and registration requirements to protect the public against reckless and financially irresponsible motorists. However, such requirements must meet basic constitutional standards. When a person meets the requirements set forth in licensing and registration laws, he may continue in the full enjoyment of those rights until it has been established that by reason of his abuse of those rights or other just cause, it is in the interest of public safety to revoke those rights. The Illinois Financial Responsibility Law effectively divests the right to drive or own automobiles from persons who cannot afford to deposit security covering claims asserted by other motorists, claims which may be inflated or fictitious, and additionally, who cannot purchase financial responsibility insurance. In short, these plaintiffs are denied a valuable right solely because of their economic status, without regard to any considerations of danger they may or may not pose to the public safety. If burdensome requirements are imposed only upon a select class of motorists, the method by which that class is selected must have a rational basis.
The plaintiffs concede that a state may compel the purchase of liability insurance as a precondition to issuance of driver’s licenses or motor vehicle registrations. Such compulsory insurance applies to all motorists on a nondiscriminatory basis. E. g., Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30 , 54 S.Ct. 3 , 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933). Statutes requiring insurance as a precondition to licensing recognize the fact that every driver is capable of negligence, and they thereby protect the public against potential negligence by all motorists. See 30 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 523, 525 (1962). Illinois has not enacted compulsory insurance legislation, however desirable it may be as a matter of social policy. Because Illinois could prohibit use and ownership of automobiles without proof of insurance coverage, it does not follow that these rights may be denied selectively without fair procedures. Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 AFL-CIO, et al. v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 , 81 S.Ct. 1743 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 , 79 S.Ct. 1400 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959). Where the interest taken or destroyed is a valuable or essential one, reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the taking must be afforded. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 , 89 S.Ct. 1820 , 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969). To say that a prior administrative hearing to consider the question of fault or potential liability is unfeasible begs the issue. We are not dealing with an emergency situation where immediate revocations of driver’s licenses or motor vehicle registrations are necessary to protect the public. Indeed, the public is far less protected against the reckless, insured motorist under this statutory scheme than it is against the uninsured, non-negligent motorist of limited financial means. A habitually reckless or negligent driver who is adequately insured or against whom an accident report has fortuitously never been filed, does not lose his license unless he is convicted of three “moving violations” within a twelve-month period. Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, Ch. 95½ § 6-206(a) (2). Viewed in this perspective, the fundamentally unfair procedures of the challenged provisions are of constitutional dimensions.
The plaintiffs also concede that a motorist adjudicated negligent, or found likely to be at fault by an administrative or state agency after notice and a hearing consistent with the principles of due process, 2 may be required to prove his *1356 financial responsibility in order to retain his driver’s license or vehicle registration. This is a reasonable classification of motorists who have demonstrated negligence in the ownership or operation of an automobile. E. g., Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 , 62 S.Ct. 24 , 86 L.Ed. 21 (1941). Similarly, the classification of persons failing to satisfy judgments arising from negligent use or ownership of an automobile has a rational basis. MacQuarrie v. McLaughlin, 294 F.Supp. 176 (D.Mass.1968), aff’d 394 U.S. 456 , 89 S.Ct. 1224 , 22 L.Ed.2d 417 (1969). By rendering considerations of fault or liability immaterial, the Illinois Financial Responsibility Law lacks the rational basis present in the Reitz and MacQuarrie decisions.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a legislative classification bear a just and proper relation to the purpose for which it is made. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465 , 77 S.Ct. 1344 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1485 (1957); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 567 , 51 S.Ct. 582 , 75 L.Ed. 1264 (1930). The apparent legislative purpose of the Illinois Financial Responsibility Law is to assure the public that negligent drivers, i. e., those likely to cause and be liable for future accidents, are financially responsible. The method employed for singling out those persons who must bear an economic burden not common to the driving public, and who may thus be effectively prohibited from owning or driving automobiles, must be rationally related to the protection of the public from irresponsible, negligent motorists. A dragnet method of selection is constitutionally impermissible. Classifications must be drawn narrowly enough so as not to include large numbers of those for whom it is unreasonable. Morey v. Doud, supra; Smith v. Cahoon, supra; Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 , 34 S.Ct. 681 , 58 L.Ed. 1129 (1914).
In imposing its restrictive provisions, the statutory scheme here challenged makes no attempt to separate those at fault in causing accidents from those not at fault. The innocent and culpable are treated in the same manner. Restricting the driving rights of the victim of an accident cannot be said to bear a proper or just relation to the protection of the public from irresponsible, negligent drivers. Merely being a party to an accident, or having one’s car involved in an accident, is not probative of fault or liability. Nor is a self-serving accident report filed by another interested party. The statutory scheme under consideration does not set forth any criteria for determination of those persons to which the statute applies other than involvement in an accident. 3 There is no apparent reason or necessity for requiring a driver or automobile owner who may have been the blameless victim of another’s negligence to either show financial responsibility or forfeit his driving rights in order to protect the public. People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210 , 363 P. 2d 180, 183 (1961). The absence of considerations of fault or liability, or any other factors relating to the public safety, health, morals, or welfare, render the Illinois Financial Responsibility Law unconstitutional for failure to provide fundamental equal protection of the law.
I would therefore grant the declaratory and injunctive relief sought by these plaintiffs and the class they represent.
. Counsel for the plaintiffs also contended during the hearing on this matter that financial responsibility insurance is more expensive than ordinary automobile liability insurance. However, the contention was not documented in the pleadings.
. The administrative hearing contemplated by the majority, and nominally prescribed by the Financial Responsibility Law, would not consider questions of fault or potential liability. Such a hearing would be an empty formality, then, insofar as the constitutional objections asserted by these plaintiffs are concerned.
. The only rational basis asserted by the defendants for the selection of persons adversely affected by this statutory scheme is that “poor people drive poor cars” and impliedly should be banned from use of their automobiles after involvement in one accident, whether they are the cause or the victim of the accident.