principles of legislative interpretation require that the legislature meant to exempt state and municipal pensions from attachment, even in divorce cases
How later courts described this case
- principles of legislative interpretation require that the legislature meant to exempt state and municipal pensions from attachment, even in divorce cases
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
POPOVICH, Judge,
dissenting:
I disagree with the Majority that vested pension benefits derived from public funds in contradistinction to private funds are not accessible, i.e., subject to attachment, for purposes of equitable distribution under the Divorce Code of 1980. 23 Pa.S.A. § 101 et seq.
With the passage of the Divorce Code of 1980, the Legislature ushered in a new era in Pennsylvania regarding divorce. The vestiges of the prior divorce law, which made no provision for alimony and equitable distribution of property, were remedied. 23 Pa.S.A. §§ 401 & 504. Additionally, the Legislature delineated certain, specific objectives it sought to achieve with the enactment of the Divorce Code of 1980. See 23 Pa.S.A. § 102. Of the various objectives itemized in Section 102, the one that is of particular relevancy to the case at bar is paragraph (6) of subsection (a), *280 wherein it provides that the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is to “[e]ffectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced ... and insure a fair and just determination and settlement of their property rights.” (Emphasis added) We find further elaboration of the aforecited italicized, terms in Chapter 4, captioned “Decree of Court; Property Rights and Costs”. Therein, the Legislature set forth a plethora of factors to be weighed by a trial court proceeding to divide, distribute or assign “marital property” between the parties equitably. As is germane to the case sub judice, a trial court is required to consider, “The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.” (Emphasis added) 23 Pa.S.A. § 401(d)(6). It is interesting to note that in the “exceptions” portion of Section 401, the Legislature only exempted “[vjeterans’ benefits ... from attachment, levy or seizure pursuant to the act of September 2, 1958, Public Law 85-857, 72 Statute 1229 [ 38 U.S.C.A. § 3101 ]____” Id. at§ 401(e)(6). No other type of benefits were excluded, e.g., public (police) or private pension funds. Thus, to the extent that local municipalities pass ordinances to the contrary, they are rendered nugatory by means of legislative fiat. Cf. Turner v. May Corp., 285 Pa.Super. 241 , 244 n. 1, 427 A.2d 203 , 204 n. 1 (1981) (“... a local rule of court is subordinate to laws promulgated by our Legislature.”).
Therefore, based on my interpretation of the current state of the law as to the treatment of pension benefits (whether they be private or public), see generally Pietro v. Pietro, 183 N.J.Super. 69 , 443 A.2d 244 (1982); Giovannoni v. Giovannoni, 122 Cal.App.3d 666 , 176 Cal.Rptr. 154 (1981); Dean v. Dean, 131 P.L.J. 62 (Allegheny Cty. 1983); Paul W. v. Margaret W., 130 P.L.J. 6 (Allegheny Cty. 1982), appellant should be afforded the right to have appellee’s pension benefits attached for purposes of equitable distribution under the aegis of the Divorce Code of 1980. Since the Majority rules to the contrary, I must respectfully dissent.