explaining that an action is “fatally flawed” if a condition precedent is not met (quoting Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127-28, 872 A.2d 1, 14 (2005))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that an action is “fatally flawed” if a condition precedent is not met (quoting Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127-28, 872 A.2d 1, 14 (2005))
- Upholding the Circuit Court’s dismissal of a complaint on the ground that the remedy before the Board of Contract Appeals was primary under the circumstances of the case, and that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust the administrative remedy
- "The purpose of [ Md. Rule 8-131(a) ] is "to require counsel to bring the position of their client to the attention of the lower court at the trial so that the trial court can pass upon, and possibly correct any errors in the proceedings[.]' " (citations omitted)
- “Once the debtor defaults, § 9-607(a) (3) provides that the secured party may enforce the obligation of an account debtor and exercise the rights of the debtor with respect to that obligation.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
MURPHY, J.
The complaint that is to be dismissed on the basis of the majority opinion was filed on June 4, 2004. Petitioner never *414 argued to the Circuit Court that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that the respondents had failed to “exhaust” their administrative remedies. Petitioner never presented this argument in the briefs it filed on the two occasions when the case at bar was pending in the Court of Special Appeals. Petitioner’s “exhaustion” argument was presented for the first time at the second oral argument in the Court of Special Appeals. Mooney v. University System, 178 Md.App. 637 , 647 n. 2, 943 A.2d 108 (2008). While this issue may be raised for the first time in this Court, I am persuaded that Respondents’ complaint should not be dismissed.
If Petitioner had disputed Chesapeake’s right to receive payment, and Chesapeake assigned its unpaid $43,005.00 claim to Respondents, Respondents would have been required to proceed administratively before the Board of Contract Appeals. The case at bar, however, does not involve a dispute between Petitioner and Chesapeake. While I agree with the majority that “[a] ‘person’ in Section 15-217 of the State Finance and Procurement Article ... does not include only the person awarded the procurement contract, but third parties representing the interests of the contracting party[,]” I do not agree that Respondents should be included in the definition of “person” on the ground that they are involved in the process of “collecting property due to another[.]” Because Respondents are not “representing the interests of the contracting party,” and are not attempting to collect funds that Petitioner had withheld from Chesapeake, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and order that this case be returned to the Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the March 3, 2008 opinion of the Court of Special Appeals.