explaining that coercive government misconduct renders statement involuntary if defendant’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973))
How later courts described this case
- explaining that coercive government misconduct renders statement involuntary if defendant’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973))
- concluding that there was no jury unanimity issue in a felony murder conviction when the underlying felony was injury to a child and the mental states of intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and with criminal negligence were alleged in the alternative
- explaining that “Miranda or article 38.22, not article 38.23, is the vehicle for excluding statements obtained in violation of the Miranda guidelines”
- declining to address issues raised in a brief because they were not raised in the petition for discretionary review
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WOMACK, J.,
concurring.
I join the judgment of the Court and its opinion except as to “Invocation of Right to Counsel” — subpart 5 of part B (“Analysis”) of Part I (“ARTICLE 38.23 INSTRUCTION”). As the opinion says (ante, at 579), the court’s charge under Article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure included an instruction on the law applicable to waiver of right to counsel. Whether the charge under Article 38.23 also should have included an instruction on the same law seems to be moot. I see no need to discuss the question of the constitutional nature of the Miranda rule which so fractured the Supreme Court in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 , 123 S.Ct. 1994 , 155 L.Ed.2d 984 (2003).