explaining that, to state a claim for legal malpractice under Pennsylvania law, an aggrieved client must allege that: (1) the parties were in an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney failed to exercise ordinary skill or knowledge; and (3) the attorney’s failure to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge was the proximate cause of damage to the client
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, to state a claim for legal malpractice under Pennsylvania law, an aggrieved client must allege that: (1) the parties were in an attorney-client relationship; (2) the attorney failed to exercise ordinary skill or knowledge; and (3) the attorney’s failure to exercise ordinary skill and knowledge was the proximate cause of damage to the client
- holding that statute of limitations on criminal malpractice complaint began to run when defendant filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because, by that point, he was “clearly on notice of [his attorney’s] alleged dereliction”
- recognizing validity of appellee’s contention that availability of actions by defendants against their former attorneys would provide powerful disincentive to practitioners to continue in field of criminal defense representation
- discussing the difference between legal malpractice and breach of contract claims against a criminal defense attorney, and holding that, to establish legal malpractice in this context one must establish that “but for” his attorney’s negligence, he would have obtained an acquittal or dismissal of the charges
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Limited by Lefta Associates v. Hurley, 902 F. Supp. 2d 559 (2012)
Because we disagree with defendants’ interpretation of Bailey, and find that decision is properly limited to the legal representation in criminal cases, we recommend that the court deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this ground as well.
The opinion
*264 PAPADAKOS, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the majority opinion but write separately to express that I would have preferred the commencement of any statute of limitations applicable in these cases to be at the time a defendant’s innocence is established in the criminal setting since the defendant has no enforceable cause of action until such time. I believe it will overburden our courts to force malpractice complaints to be filed within two, four or six years after the dissolution of the attorney-client relationship. Such complaints will languish in the court backlog for years until all criminal proceedings have culminated in innocence.
My colleagues have opted for an earlier commencement date and time will tell what mischief, if any, will be visited upon our courts by the premature filing of complaints by every defendant following sentencing and the change of lawyers for the prosecution of post-trial motions and appeals.