“Such an interpretation [allowing for dual-track litigation] would immediately create a conflict since the jurisdiction of the [Board] of Claims is expressly made exclusive.”
How later courts described this case
- “Such an interpretation [allowing for dual-track litigation] would immediately create a conflict since the jurisdiction of the [Board] of Claims is expressly made exclusive.”
- “The true test in determining when a cause of action arises or accrues is to establish the time when the plaintiff could have first maintained the action to a successful conclusion.”
- § 1983 damage action brought in state court is barred to extent state has preserved its traditional immunities
- cause of action accrues when plaintiff first could have maintained action to a successful conclusion
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HUTCHINSON, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that appellant’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim (Count I) is not barred by sovereign immunity. Moreover, I also concur with the majority’s holding that Count II of the complaint must be dismissed because it is not within the exclusive original jurisdiction of either the Board of Claims or the Commonwealth Court.
I write separately, however, to reiterate our holding in Ziccardi v. Commonwealth, Department of General Services, 500 Pa. 326 , 456 A.2d 979 (1982), that a union’s failure to process a grievance to arbitration is not an unfair labor practice within our Labor Board’s jurisdiction. In Ziccardi we held that, under certain circumstances, an employee’s remedy for the conduct complained of in Count II is an action against his union for damages resulting from the union’s bad faith failure to proceed to arbitration, not a proceeding before the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board. As stated in Ziccardi , the employee’s burden in such an action is heavy, his pleading and proof must be specific and “[T]he union ... must be given broad discretion in determining whether to pursue the remedy.” 500 Pa. at 330 , 456 A.2d at 981 . Moreover, appellant is not entitled to bring an equity or assumpsit action against her employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement unless he shows by *103 specific facts that the employer participated in the union’s bad faith or conspired with it to deny the employee the job protection afforded by the collective bargaining agreement. 500 Pa. at 332 , 456 A.2d at 982 . In this case, appellant’s assertions that his union and employer breached the collective bargaining agreement are too general to set forth a cause of action.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this opinion.