explaining that a successful prosecution for constructive possession of contraband requires proof that the defendant (1) knew of the contraband's presence and had both (2) the ability and (3) the intent to exercise dominion and control over it
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a successful prosecution for constructive possession of contraband requires proof that the defendant (1) knew of the contraband's presence and had both (2) the ability and (3) the intent to exercise dominion and control over it
- finding evidence insufficient even though “two bags of cocaine, worth a few hundred dollars on the street, [were] lying exposed to -view” where “[t]here was no evidence the occupants of the car were actively engaged in distributing drugs” (emphasis added)
- stating that a defendant can possess an item by, among other avenues, (1) knowing about the presence of the item and (2) having “both the ability and the intent to exercise dominion or control over it”
- reversing the conviction of an automobile passenger for constructive possession of narcotics in the vehicle, stating: "There must be something to prove that the individual was not merely an incidental bystander. It may be foolish to stand by when others are acting illegally, or to associate with those who have committed a crime. Such conduct or association, however, without more, does not establish the offenses here charged.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Jackson v. United States, 2013 D.C. App. LEXIS 61 (2013)
The government argues, however, that its evidence was sufficient and that Rivas is distinguishable both because of the “circumstances surrounding appellant’s position in the car” — namely that Mr. Jackson was “the only person sitting next to a large quantity of drugs packaged for distribution” — and because it “presented evidence to show the existence of an ‘ongoing criminal operation.
The opinion
STEADMAN, Associate Judge,
with whom WAGNER, Chief Judge, and TERRY, Associate Judge, join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in parts I and 11(A), (B), and (C) of the majority opinion. My disagreement is with the application of those principles to the specific facts of this case in order to determine the sufficiency issue. 1
The task of ruling on constitutional sufficiency “does not require a court to ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (citations omitted). The emphases were placed by the Supreme Court in its original holding.
Applying that test, I am unable to conclude on the record here that no rational trier of fact could have found appellant guilty under the requisite standard. The majority opinion lays out the factual elements, and I note most particularly the actions of appellant in exiting the automobile and departing the scene in the presence of police. This behavior, in the context of the entire circumstances, admitted of a reasonable conclusion and inference that the actions were those of a person increasingly disassociating himself from drugs in his possession with the growing involvement of the police; that is, an initial act of distancing himself — but not too far — from the car followed by his abrupt departure from sight when he saw that the police were serious about investigating. Furthermore, the nature of the exit itself from the car bears note: the Honda was stopped in the middle of the street late at night, the police car pulled up behind it, and at that point, presumably having observed the police car, the appellant left the car still parked in the middle of the street, leaving the door open in a manner suggesting an intention to return and maintain ready access to the inside of that vehicle where the drugs were in plain view next to where he had been sitting,
As the Supreme Court reasserted in the above-cited case, in which it ultimately concluded that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient, the prosecutor is not under an affirmative duty to rule out every *155 hypothesis except that of guilt. “That theory the Court has rejected in the past.” Id. at 829, 99 S.Ct. 2781 . See also Owens v. United States, 688 A.2d 399, 406-08 (D.C.1996) (Schwelb, J., concurring).
No claim is made that the jury here was not fully and correctly instructed on the meaning of the concept of “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” While I do not doubt the duty of this court to strike down convictions that fail to meet the constitutional standard of proof, I cannot say that the twelve members of the jury who heard all the evidence first-hand acted irrationally in finding the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or that the trial court twice erred in coming to a like conclusion in denying the repeated motions for a judgment of acquittal.
. This issue standing alone would hardly justify review by the en banc court. See D.C.App. R. 40(e) (rehearing en banc will not ordinarily be ordered except where necessary to maintain uniformity of decisions or where proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance). The en banc opinion having resolved the possible conflict in our prior decisions, I would have been quite willing to remand the case to the panel for application of the relevant principles to this specific case. However, since the en banc court has determined to deal with the appeal as a whole, I will do likewise.