concluding that any error by the trial court in sustaining the prosecution’s objections to certain portions of a defense expert’s testimony wasn’t sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal because “the defendant did not make an offer of proof to the trial court to establish for the record precisely what [the expert] would have said, had he been permitted to testify”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that any error by the trial court in sustaining the prosecution’s objections to certain portions of a defense expert’s testimony wasn’t sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal because “the defendant did not make an offer of proof to the trial court to establish for the record precisely what [the expert] would have said, had he been permitted to testify”
- concluding that, while the record revealed the trial court’s rude comments to defense counsel and irritation with defense witnesses, the record as a whole did not establish that bent of mind warranting a finding of bias against the defendant
- recognizing that, in analyzing whether a defendant was sufficiently prejudiced by excluded portions of his expert’s testimony, that the jury was still informed of the expert’s opinion
- holding that there was insufficient evidence of bias despite the judge’s snide and insinuating manner
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ERICKSON, Justice,
specially concurring:
I concur with the opinion written by Justice Kirshbaum, but specially concur because of the two separate dissents which address the constitutionality of the death penalty. The record of the guilt phase contains numerous errors, none of which individually or collectively constitute reversible error. The death penalty phase of the case, however, does require reversal because of errors committed during that phase of the trial. Accordingly, under the facts of this case, I cannot uphold the sentence of death.
In my view, People v. Durre, 690 P.2d 165 (Colo.1984), requires reversal of the death penalty. I agree with the Durre analysis set forth in the majority opinion, but write separately to express my view that section 16-11-103, 8A C.R.S. (1986), does not suffer from the same infirmities that caused us to declare the predecessor death penalty statute to be unconstitutional in People v. District Court, 196 Colo. 401 , 586 P.2d 31 (1978). In People v. District Court, we pointed out the infirmities in the death penalty statute, which the General Assembly corrected by enacting section 16-11-103. I agree with Justice Vollack’s analysis of the present statute and his conclusion that the statute is constitutional. I cannot, however, join Justice Vollack’s dissent because of our decision in Durre .