explaining that Kolupa was “no longer valid in light of the Supreme Court’s recent rejection of the famous remark in Conley v. Gibson[, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)] from which [it] derive[s], that ‘a .complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief ” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561, 127 S.Ct. 1955)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that Kolupa was “no longer valid in light of the Supreme Court’s recent rejection of the famous remark in Conley v. Gibson[, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)] from which [it] derive[s], that ‘a .complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief ” (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 561, 127 S.Ct. 1955)
- holding religious discrimination plaintiff need only say that the employer held the worker’s religion against him
- noting that pleading rules are designed to “[e]ncourag[e] a plaintiff to plead what few facts can be easily provided” and that a plaintiff should "alert[ ] the defendant to basic, critical factual allegations”
- stating that a plaintiff must allege facts suggesting a right to relief and “raising that possibility above a ‘speculative level’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FLAUM, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the majority’s final conclusions that the EEOC’s complaint does not meet the notice pleading standards of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that the EEOC did not plead itself out of court by referring to the charge in its complaint. I respectfully disagree, however, that the complaint was insufficient under our pre-Bell Atlantic case law. 1
In my judgment, the EEOC’s complaint- — which alleged that Concentra retaliated against Horn because he reported a colorable Title VII violation — was sufficient before Bell Atlantic, as I find it difficult to distinguish from other equally sparse pleadings that this Court previously approved. See Kolupa v. Roselle Park Dist., 438 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that a complaint would satisfy Rule 8(a) if it alleged that an “employer ... caused some concrete injury by holding the worker’s religion against him”); Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir.1998) (noting that a complaint would satisfy Rule 8(a) if it alleged “I was turned down for a job because of my race”). Moreover, other circuits have approved complaints that, for all practical purposes, are the same as the one in this case. See Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1220 (D.C.Cir.2006) (stating that a complaint in a retaliation case need only say, “[T]he Government retaliated against me because I engaged in protected activity.”); Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285 , 296 (3d Cir.2006) (“[T]o plead a retaliation claim under the First Amendment, a plaintiff must allege: (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2) retaliatory action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (3) a causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the retaliatory action.”). 2
*784 Although I conclude that the EEOC’s complaint would have been sufficient under this and other circuits’ pre-Bell Atlantic case law, I am unable to share the majority’s view that Bell Atlantic left our notice pleading jurisprudence intact. Indeed, as I read Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court in interpreting Rule 8(a) required that a plaintiff plead enough facts to demonstrate a plausible claim. Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1959 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). Cf. Kolupa, 438 F.3d at 715 (stating that “complaints need not plead facts”). Because in my view the EEOC’s complaint did not meet that threshold, I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the district court’s dismissal.
. I also disagree with the majority’s suggestion that Bell Atlantic dismissed the plaintiffs' suit because they pled too much detail. See slip op. at n. 1. Rather, it appears that the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint because it did not plead enough. See Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-69 ("Because the plaintiffs here have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.”).
. In Kyle v. Morton High School, 144 F.3d 448, 454 (7th Cir.1998), the pre-5eZZ Allantic decision which the majority opinion cites approvingly, this Court held that the plaintiffs complaint did not give the defendant notice of his claim because it did not allege that the plaintiff engaged in protected speech and pled only legal conclusions without providing any supporting facts. However, in McCormick v. City of Chicago, 230 F.3d 319, 324-25 (7th Cir.2000), this Court separated itself from the position that a plaintiff cannot state a claim by reciting mere legal conclusions. As a result, the Kyle approach was limited, at least to the extent that it required a plaintiff alleging retaliation to provide details about his protected speech.