construing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.019(f) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.) and concluding that the language “means what it says”—i.e., that “a party can move to quash a charging instrument at any time prior to the day on which the trial on the merits commences”
How later courts described this case
- construing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 45.019(f) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.) and concluding that the language “means what it says”—i.e., that “a party can move to quash a charging instrument at any time prior to the day on which the trial on the merits commences”
- interpreting an analogous provision of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 49.019(f) and holding that a trial Acommences@ when a jury is empaneled and sworn
- interpreting an analogous provision, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 49.019(f), and holding that a trial commences when a jury is impaneled and sworn
- “If the Legislature wanted the statute to mean that a defendant must make a motion to quash before the date on which the cause was set for trial, it could simply have said so . . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRICE, J.,
dissenting.
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 45.019(f) says that a defendant must object to any defects in a charging instrument filed in a justice or municipal court “before the date on which the trial on the merits commences.” I understand the majority to say that, when Article 45.019(f) is read according to its plain meaning, the language quoted above refers to the date on which the trial actually begins. I also understand the majority to conclude that this does not produce an absurd result.
I cannot agree with the majority’s second conclusion. As a result, I respectfully dissent.
The majority’s construction of Article 45.019(f) will render the subsection meaningless if a trial court sustains the objection and quashes the charging instrument. 1 If the objection is sustained and thus, the trial does not commence, then it will not matter on what date the objection was raised. Thus, the Article’s time bar is meaningless in that situation. I can think of no other instance in criminal law where a ruling on the merits can render an objection timely or not.
It is odd to assume that a trial will not commence on the date it is set for trial. Although trials are often reset, parties generally show up on the date trial is set prepared to begin.
I want to add a word of caution to criminal defendants. If a defendant files an objection to the charging instrument on the date that the trial is set, he will be not be allowed to appeal a trial court’s overruling of the objection if the trial actually begins on that date.
Because the majority’s construction of Article 45.019 produces absurd results, I respectfully dissent.
. I assume it would be the same for Article 1.14, which deals with objections to charging instruments in district or county courts, because the language is identical.