concluding the evidence supported trial judge’s finding of the (G)(1) factor when the defendant “used drugs continuously for a period of over nine years” and “medical testimony [showed] that this continuous use of drugs likely impaired defendant’s volitional capabilities”
How later courts described this case
- concluding the evidence supported trial judge’s finding of the (G)(1) factor when the defendant “used drugs continuously for a period of over nine years” and “medical testimony [showed] that this continuous use of drugs likely impaired defendant’s volitional capabilities”
- concluding defendant's mental capabilities were significantly, but only partially, impaired based on "medical testimony that this continuous use of drugs likely impaired defendant's volitional capabilities"
- determining whether mitigating circumstances are sufficiently substantial involves weighing and balancing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances that are present
- holding that the “trial court correctly found” the (E)(2) aggravator “based on the defendant’s nine prior convictions for first degree murder”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GORDON, Vice Chief Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree that the trial court properly found three aggravating circumstances— previous convictions of another offense for which life imprisonment or death was impossible, previous conviction of a felony involving the threat or use of violence, and that the defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. I also agree that no mitigating circumstances existed sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Therefore, I concur in the correctness of the imposition of the sentence of death in this matter. However, to be faithful to my position in State v. Clark, 126 Ariz. 428 , 616 P.2d 888 (1980), I cannot agree with the majority’s interpretation of the aggravating circumstance concerning pecuniary gain.