upholding a theft-by-receiving conviction even though section 5-36-106(c) did not apply because the State presented evidence that the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the property was stolen
How later courts described this case
- upholding a theft-by-receiving conviction even though section 5-36-106(c) did not apply because the State presented evidence that the defendant knew or had reason to believe that the property was stolen
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Andree Layton Roaf, Judge, dissenting. I would reverse this conviction because I do not believe there is sufficient evidence in this case as to whether Rodney Doubleday knew or had good reason to believe the trailer had been stolen. I agree with the majority that the State was not entitled to the statutory presumptions found in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-106 (c) (Supp. 2003). However, while Doubleday’s explanation that tags on the trailer were accidently switched need not be believed by the trier of fact, it is still a circumstantial evidence case, and simply having the wrong tags on a trailer does not exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than Doubleday knew or had reason to know the trailer was stolen. I also cannot conclude that he has given an “improbable explanation” in this instance, as asserted in the majority opinion. It is a misdemeanor to display a license plate on a vehicle when the plate is not issued for that vehicle, see Ark. Code Ann. § 27-14-306 (Repl. 1994). However, while- it is a transgression, it is certainly not a rare, unusual or “improbable” occurrence.
The longstanding rule in the use of circumstantial evidence is that the evidence must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused in order to be substantial. Haynes v. State, 354 Ark. 514 , 127 S.W.3d 456 (2003). In Haynes, the supreme court quoted from Bowie v. State, 185 Ark. 834 , 49 S.W.2d 1049 (1932), as follows:
This demands that in a case depending upon circumstantial evidence the circumstances relied upon must be so connected and cogent as to show guilt to a moral certainty, and must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than than of the guilt of the accused. Circumstances, however strong they may be, ought never to coerce the mind of the jury to a conclusion of guilt if they can be reconciled with the theory that one other than the defendant has committed the crime, or that no crime has been committed at all.
Once a trial court determines that the evidence is sufficient to go to the jury, the question of whether the circumstantial evidence excludes every hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the jury to decide. Haynes, supra. Upon review, the appellate court determines whether the jury resorted to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. Id. Two equally reasonable conclusions as to what occurred merely give rise to a suspicion of guilt. The appellate court will set aside a judgment based upon evidence that did not meet the required standards, and thus left the fact finder only to speculation and conjecture. Id. Overwhelming evidence of guilt is not required in cases based on circumstantial evidence; rather, the test is one of substantiality. Edmond v. State, 351 Ark. 495 , 95 S.W.3d 789 (2003).
In this case, the majority can point to no evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, to support the conclusion that Doubleday had knowledge that the trailer was stolen other than that the license plate and the trailer did not match. This may be sufficient evidence to warrant a suspicion that Doubleday might have known or suspected that the trailer was stolen, but it hardly meets the test of substantiality required to support this conviction. I would therefore reverse and dismiss this case.
Vaught, J., joins this dissent.