noting that courts have been forced to broadly define terms like active conduct to avoid the general rule limiting liability
How later courts described this case
- noting that courts have been forced to broadly define terms like active conduct to avoid the general rule limiting liability
- “[T]o approach the problem in these manners would only add to the confusion, complexity, and fictions which have resulted from the common law distinctions.”
- superseded in part by statute as explained in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 19 Cal.4th 714, 80 Cal. Rptr.2d 506, 968 P.2d 65, 71-72 (1998)
- plaintiff's status may have "some bearing on the question of liability, [but] is not determinative"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated by statute, as recognized in Smith v. Freund
69 Cal.2d 108, 113 (Rowland), superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Perez v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 462, 467
Superseded on other grounds by Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 506 (1998)
69 Cal.2d 108, 112-113 (Rowland), superseded on other grounds as stated in Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery (1998) 19 Cal.4th 714, 722
Distinguished
Distinguished by Krupnick v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 28 Cal. App. 4th 185 (1994)
In other words, because its holding can only be coexistensive with its facts, Rowland is inapposite to the issue before us.
The opinion
BURKE, J.
I dissent. In determining the liability of the occupier or owner of land for injuries, the distinctions between trespassers, licensees and invitees have been developed and applied by the courts over a period of many years. They supply a reasonable and workable approach to the problems involved, and one which provides the degree of stability and predictability so highly prized in the law. The unfortunate alternative, it appears to me, is the route taken by the majority in their opinion in this case; that such issues are to be decided on a case by case basis under the application of the basic law of negligence, bereft of the guiding principles and precedent which the law has heretofore attached by virtue of the relationship of the parties to one another.
Liability for negligence turns upon whether a duty of care is owed, and if so, the extent thereof. Who can doubt that the corner grocery, the large department store, or the financial institution owes a greater duty of care to one whom it has *121 invited to enter its premises as a prospective customer of its wares or services than it owes to a trespasser seeking to enter after the close of business hours and for a nonbusiness or even an antagonistic purpose? I do not think it unreasonable or unfair that a social guest (classified by the law as a licensee, as was plaintiff here) should be obliged to take the premises in the same condition as his host finds them or permits them to be. Surely a homeowner should not be obliged to hover over his guests with warnings of possible dangers to be found in the condition of the home (e.g., waxed floors, slipping rugs, toys in unexpected places, etc., etc.). Yet today’s decision appears to open the door to potentially unlimited liability despite the purpose and circumstances motivating the plaintiff in entering the premises of another, and despite the caveat of the majority that the status of the parties may “have some bearing on the question of liability . . . ,” whatever the future may show that language to mean.
In my view, it is not a proper function of this court to overturn the learning, wisdom and experience of the past in this field. Sweeping modifications of tort liability law fall more suitably within the domain of the Legislature, before which all affected interests can be heard and which can enact statutes providing uniform standards and guidelines for the future.
I would affirm the judgment for defendant.
McComb, J., concurred.