holding an award of reasonable attorney fees in civil rights actions is not limited to costs enumerated in RCW 4.84.010 ("The great weight of authority allows a prevailing civil rights plaintiff to recover reasonable expenses incurred.") (citing Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 707 F.2d 636 (1st Cir.1983) (reasonable and necessary costs include out-of-pocket expenses for transportation, lodging, parking, food, and telephone expenses))
How later courts described this case
- holding an award of reasonable attorney fees in civil rights actions is not limited to costs enumerated in RCW 4.84.010 ("The great weight of authority allows a prevailing civil rights plaintiff to recover reasonable expenses incurred.") (citing Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 707 F.2d 636 (1st Cir.1983) (reasonable and necessary costs include out-of-pocket expenses for transportation, lodging, parking, food, and telephone expenses))
- holding that RCW 4.84.010 did not limit the costs recoverable in a discrimination action where the relevant discrimination statute includes an applicable cost provision
- affirming the trial court’s determination that the “attorney fees incurred for the successful and unsuccessful claims were inseparable” and the court’s award of all attorney fees
- concluding that football should be included in a comparison of athletic programs
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco Inc., 934 P.2d 685 (1997)
However, our decision in Blair is distinguishable from the present case and does not signal an intent by this court to retreat from the American rule.
The opinion
Dore, J.
(dissenting) — The majority bases its decision on *578 the scope of costs on the language of RCW 49.60.030(2). This statute provides, in part, that:
Any person deeming himself injured . . . shall have a civil action ... to recover the actual damages sustained by him . . . together with the cost of suit including a reasonable attorney's fees . . .
Since the scope of "the cost of suit" has not been defined prior to this suit, the majority looks to federal law for precedence. It does so because this is a civil rights case and this court has previously looked to federal law to help interpret the state civil rights law provisions of RCW 49.60. See, e.g., Fahn v. Cowlitz Cy., 95 Wn.2d 679 , 628 P.2d 813 (1981).
The error the majority commits, however, is that we have defined "the costs of suit" in another context. RCW 19.86, the Consumer Protection Act, provides that an injured party may
recover the actual damages sustained by him . . . together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee . . .
RCW 19.86.090. In Nordstrom, Inc. v. Tampourlos, 107 Wn.2d 735, 743 , 733 P.2d 208 (1987), this court specifically held that "costs" recoverable under the attorney fees section of the Consumer Protection Act were those narrowly defined in RCW 4.84.010.
The majority's rationale that civil rights litigants deserve greater recovery than other classes of litigants, and therefore deserve to recover greater "costs" is unjustifiable. A Consumer Protection Act plaintiff may also be suing for a remedy which is nonmonetary, and also may be enforcing rights which our Legislature has deemed of great public import. A trade secrets plaintiff may also only receive an injunction without a monetary award of damages in order to enforce his or her rights. This court has already declared that those plaintiffs should not receive a much increased award by a liberal use of the costs provision, and I see little reason why a civil rights claimant should receive this additional — and I believe, unjustifiable — benefit.
*579 Costs other than those defined in RCW 4.84.010 normally account for a percentage of the attorney's hourly rate. To allow the attorney recovery of his reasonable attorney fee, and then to add an expanded costs bill, allows the attorney an unjust windfall.
I would not allow this result to occur. I therefore dissent.
Reconsideration denied October 27, 1987.