concluding that instructional error is not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome
How later courts described this case
- concluding that instructional error is not subject to reversal unless an examination of the entire record establishes reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome
- holding that certain trial errors are harmless unless there is a reasonable probability that a different result would have occurred absent the error
- defining prejudice as the reasonable probability of a result more favorable to defendant
- "[A] 'miscarriage of justice’ should be declared only when the court, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ is of the 'opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (citation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disagreed with by People v. Gilman, 156 Cal. App. 3d 760 (1984)
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 [299 P.2d 243], We must disagree with
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Martinez, 82 Cal. App. 3d 1 (1978)
prejudice has been rebutted, it is clear that the usual “harmless error” tests for determining the prejudicial effect of an error (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-828, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065]; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836) are inapplicable.
Distinguished by People v. Matta, 57 Cal. App. 3d 472 (1976)
Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818) is inapplicable in determining whether the failure to instruct on lesser included offenses mandates a reversal.
The opinion
SCHAUER, J.,
Dissenting.—In the majority opinion it is recognized that “It is the right of a witness [italics added] to be protected from irrelevant, improper or insulting questions, and ... to be examined only as to matters legal and pertinent to the issue.” (See Code Civ. Proe., §§2065, 2066.) When the “witness” is also the defendant on trial for his life or liberty, failure to accord him that specifically declared right takes on vastly greater import than where the victim of the misconduct is affected only as a witness.
The majority opinion also recognizes that “The challenged but admitted evidence was undoubtedly collateral and irrelevant to any issue in the case. The casting of aspersions on defendant’s reasons for wearing an Army uniform that he was entitled [apparently required] to wear, and offering evidence to show an attempt to get a discharge from the Army had no bearing on his motive or credibility in relation to the crime charged.” In other words, it is conceded that the object and effect of asking the improper questions was to prejudice the defendant in the minds of the jurors.
Technical proof of guilt and effective persuasion of guilt may be quite different things. For proof of guilt to sustain the verdict on appellate review the prosecution relies upon circumstantial evidence which, while not wholly insufficient as a matter of law, is far from being overwhelming or even satisfyingly convincing as a matter of substance. Many of the suspicious circumstances are susceptible'of innocent construction. The finding of guilt rests heavily upon inferences drawn in some respects from objective facts and as to other elements from opinion evidence. Certainly, resolution of the conflicting inferences and of the ultimate fact is for the jury, but when the scales of proof are so delicately balanced it should be resolved by a jury which has heard relevant evidence and which has not been prejudiced and thereby persuaded by irrelevant matters. It seems rather clear to me that the natural result of the conceded error was a mis *839 carriage of justice—a verdict of guilty materially aided by other than relevant evidence and, hence, obtained by means other than those delimited by the standards of a fair trial.
For a more complete narration of the evidence, elaboration of the general unfair conduct of the trial, and a correct application of the pertinent rules of law, reference is made to the opinion prepared for the District Court of Appeal by Presiding Justice Peters and concurred in by Justices Bray and Fred B. Wood, Jr., reported at (Cal.App.) 288 P.2d 184 .
For the reasons therein and hereinabove indicated I conclude that there has been a miscarriage of justice and would reverse and remand for a new trial.