The opinion
WARREN, J.,
dissenting.
The majority misunderstands the law that applies to plaintiff* 1 and others who are subject to the parole matrix system. As a result, it asks the wrong questions and gives the wrong answers. When we ask the right questions we find that plaintiffs challenge to the 1994 order is not moot and that we should reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court to decide the merits of that challenge.
The foundation for the majority’s conclusion that the case is moot is its understanding that plaintiffs sentence in *234 itself justifies his current incarceration and that the actions of the Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision gave him no right to release. In the majority’s view, the Board’s order granting a specific parole release date has no effect on the validity of plaintiffs incarceration, because the Board attempted to extend the release date before it actually arrived. It does not matter to the majority that the Board’s 1994 order extending the release date may have been invalid; according to the majority, the subsequent 1996 order cures that invalidity. That is true, the majority holds, even if the invalid 1994 order was the only reason that plaintiff was incarcerated when the Board issued the 1996 order. The majority holds that the 1996 order renders plaintiffs challenge to the 1994 order moot, even if he was entitled to release when he originally filed this petition. It thereby allows the time that is necessary for the judicial system to resolve plaintiff s claims to become a method for denying him the release to which he may otherwise be entitled.
The majority bases its decision on a fundamental misunderstanding of the parole matrix system, which was in effect when plaintiff committed his offense and which therefore applies to him. I will therefore first discuss that system. ORS 144.780(1) 2 required the Board to adopt rules that established “ranges of duration of imprisonment to be served for felony offenses prior to release on parole” in accordance with the standards described in ORS 144.780(2), subject to adjustment for aggravation or mitigation under ORS 144.785. What the statute calls “ranges of duration” became the parole “matrix” that the Board applied in determining parole release dates for prisoners before the adoption of the sentencing guidelines. The law in 1985 required the Board to conduct a parole hearing and to set an initial parole release date within six months of the prisoner’s incarceration. ORS 144.120(1). In setting the release date, the Board was to apply the matrix. ORS 144.120(2). 3 ORS 144.245(1) describes the effect of a parole release date under the matrix system:
*235 “When the State Board of Parole has set a date on which a prisoner is to be released upon parole, the prisoner shall he released on that date unless the prisoner on that date remains subject to an unexpired minimum term during which the prisoner is not eligible for parole, in which case the prisoner shall not be released until the expiration of the minimum term.” 4 (Emphasis added.)
A parole release date, thus, creates a specific time, generally shorter than the prisoner’s sentence, when the prisoner is legally entitled to be freed from prison and after which further confinement would be illegal. The only exception to that right to release is the Board’s authority to extend the parole release date for a specific reason under ORS 144.125 or some other applicable statute. In Addicks v. Board of Parole, 63 Or App 409, 412 , 663 P2d 1310 (1983), we described the relationship between the prisoner’s sentence and the workings of the matrix system:
“Under the present matrix system, a firm release date is established, using the ranges of duration of imprisonment determined under the matrix system. The effect of the new system is to set prison terms, although circumstances may arise after the setting of the release date that can result in a change.”
As the Supreme Court succinctly stated, “The legislature has authorized the Board to determine the actual duration of an inmate’s imprisonment.” Price v. Board of Parole, 300 Or 283, 288 , 709 P2d 1075 (1985).
The nature of the matrix system, thus, is directly contrary to much of the majority’s discussion. Once the Board establishes a parole release date, the superintendent’s authority to confine the prisoner after that date is unrelated to the prisoner’s sentence. Rather, it depends on whether the Board has validly revoked or extended the release date. If the Board has not, ORS 144.245(1) requires the prisoner’s release. The only remaining function of the original sentence is to establish the outermost limit of the Board’s authority to extend the release date. With that exception, the sentence has dropped out of the picture.
*236 The real question in this case is whether, after the Board issued the 1996 order, plaintiff may challenge the 1994 order that kept him in prison beyond his original release date. Because the Board would have had no authority to issue the 1996 order if plaintiff had not been in prison, 5 I would hold that the collateral consequences of the 1994 order continue to affect plaintiff and that his challenge to it, therefore, is not moot.
Plaintiff was originally scheduled to be released on parole on or before October 18, 1994. 6 On October 11, the Board rescinded his parole release date because of a pending disciplinary infraction. Thereafter, it extended his parole release date to October 18,1996. In 1996, while this case was pending in the trial court, the Board issued a new order, extending the parole release date to October 1998. That action does not make plaintiffs challenge to the 1994 order moot, because the 1994 order has collateral consequences that continue to affect plaintiff.
A case that is otherwise justiciable, but in which a decision will no longer have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties, is moot. State v. Macy, 320 Or 408, 412 , 886 P2d 1010 (1994). The collateral consequences aspect of the mootness doctrine is part of determining whether a decision will have a practical effect on the rights of a party. It is well established in Oregon, and we discussed it in some detail in State v. Van Tassel, 5 Or App 376 , 484 P2d 1117 (1971). In that case, we held that the collateral effects of an involuntary mental commitment, including damage to reputation and the possibility of being held liable for the costs of the commitment, were such that whether the commitment was valid did not become moot upon the person’s release. 7 In *237 reaching that conclusion we examined a number of criminal cases from this and other jurisdictions, all of which held that a case was not moot, even if the defendant had served the full sentence and paid the full fine, if the conviction continued to have identifiable collateral consequences. We noted that the United States Supreme Court had recently gone further by presuming that a conviction has collateral consequences and no longer requiring a party to identify specific consequences that applied to his or her particular case. 5 Or App at 379-83 .
We have applied the collateral consequences rule in holding that a number of cases were not moot. See, e.g., Bagby v. OSP, 118 Or App 421, 428 , 847 P2d 898 , rev den 317 Or 396 (1993) (challenge to placement in disciplinary segregation is not moot on release from placement because custody level is higher than previously and some programs are no longer available); Yeon Street Partners v. Environmental Consulting, 112 Or App 251, 255 , 828 P2d 477 (1992) (tenant’s appeal from preliminary judgment did not become moot when tenant moved out, because cannot predict what collateral consequences tenant would suffer from refusal to review permanent injunction); State v. Meyer, 31 Or App 775 , 571 P2d 550 (1977) (appeal of contempt conviction not moot after sentence served, because conviction had collateral consequences beyond jail term); Pyle v. Brooks, 31 Or App 479 , 570 P2d 990 (1977) (following Van Tassel). On the other hand, we have dismissed cases as moot when the appealing party could not identify any collateral consequences of the challenged action. See, e.g., Frey v. Board of Parole, 151 Or App 267 , 948 P2d 738 (1997), rev den 326 Or 530 (1998) (no collateral consequences from order imposing incarceration for parole violation when petitioner had served term and Board had no authority to impose additional incarceration); Stewart v. PSRB, 125 Or App 576 , 864 P2d 880 (1993) (order denying release moot when petitioner released under different order two weeks later and identified no collateral consequences of *238 challenged order); State v. Chase, 120 Or App 523 , 851 P2d 637 (1993) (order revoking probation and executing sentence moot when petitioner had served sentence and been discharged from parole and did not identify any collateral consequences of order).
In this case, if plaintiff had been released on his original parole date, he would not have been in prison in 1996, and the Board would have had no authority to issue the 1996 order. Thus, the 1994 order that kept plaintiff imprisoned was essential to the 1996 order under which he is presently incarcerated, and plaintiffs current incarceration is a collateral consequence of the 1994 order. He should therefore be able to challenge the 1994 order as part of an attack on his current imprisonment.
This application of the collateral consequences rule is implicit in our previous cases, although none of them deals with this precise situation. Federal habeas corpus cases concerning the use of an expired sentence to enhance a current sentence or otherwise to affect a current incarceration are closer to the facts of this case and lead to the same conclusion. Under the federal cases, an attack on an expired sentence is not moot if that sentence is a foundation for a current sentence. In this case, by the same reasoning, when an expired Board order is a foundation for a later order, and that later order provides the authority for the current imprisonment, an attack on the expired order is not moot.
Collins v. Hesse, 957 F2d 746 (10th Cir 1992), is typical of federal cases that hold that a district court should review an expired conviction when that conviction is used to enhance the petitioner’s current sentence. Those cases often give primary attention to whether the petitioner is “in custody” for the purposes of jurisdiction under 28 USC § 2254 , the federal habeas corpus statute. After resolving that question, they hold, almost as a matter of course, that if the petitioner is “in custody” for some reason arising from the expired conviction, an attack on the expired conviction is not moot.
In Collins, the petitioner was serving three consecutive life sentences as a habitual criminal. He sought relief from four expired convictions that, he asserted, were the basis for the habitual criminal determination. On appeal, the *239 Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that a prisoner who is in custody on a repeat offender sentence that is based on a previous conviction can attack the previous conviction even though the sentence on that conviction is fully satisfied. The court noted that, in common with other circuits, it had previously reached the same conclusion and stated that it was unaware of any federal appellate court that had decided the issue differently. See also Young v. Vaughn, 83 F3d 72, 76 (3d Cir 1996) (citing cases). 8 The appellate court’s only disagreement with the district court was about whether there was evidence that the expired convictions were the basis for the habitual offender sentences. Because it concluded that there was such evidence, it reversed the district court’s dismissal of the petition and remanded for a decision on the merits.
The federal courts apply these general principles to other situations in which the expired conviction may have affected the current confinement. Thus, in Young , the petitioner was convicted in state court in 1984 of burglary and was placed on probation. In 1989, during the probationary period on the 1984 conviction, he was convicted of robbery and sentenced to prison. As a result of the 1989 conviction, the state court revoked his probation on the 1984 conviction and sentenced him to prison. After completing the sentence for the 1989 conviction, but while still serving the sentence for the 1984 conviction, he filed a federal habeas petition attacking the 1989 conviction. The Third Circuit saw that situation as essentially identical to that of a prisoner in custody under a sentence that was enhanced as the result of a prior conviction: the petitioner sought “to attack a conviction whose sentence has expired but which caused the sentence *240 he is presently serving.” Id. at 77-78 . The petition, therefore, was not moot, and the district court erred by dismissing it.
In Brock v. Weston, 31 F3d 887 (9th Cir 1994), the petitioner had been convicted of assault in 1974 and had completed the 10-year sentence in 1984. In 1991, the state civilly committed him as a “sexually violent predator,” using the 1974 conviction as one of the grounds for supporting that designation. The petitioner then filed a federal habeas petition attacking the validity of the 1974 conviction. The Ninth Circuit first held that the district court should have construed the petition as attacking the 1974 conviction in the context of the attack on the commitment as a sexually violent predator. It then instructed the district court, in accordance with a previous Ninth Circuit case, to determine whether the 1974 conviction had served as a predicate to the current commitment. If so, the district court should reach the merits of the challenge to the 1974 conviction. Id. at 890-91 .
The federal rule, thus, is that a challenge to a previous conviction is not moot if the conviction plays any role in the petitioner’s current incarceration. That rule is based on the collateral consequences of the expired conviction. The reasoning behind the federal rule is consistent with Oregon cases and applies to the Board orders involved in this case. Because the Board had no authority to issue the 1996 order if the 1994 order was invalid, the validity of the 1996 order— and, thus, the validity of plaintiffs current confinement— depends on the validity of the 1994 order. We should reverse and remand so that the trial court may determine that issue. Because we do not, I dissent.
Armstrong and Wollheim, JJ., join in this dissent.
The majority, reflecting our common usage in habeas corpus cases, refers to the party seeking the writ as “plaintiff,” although technically he is a “petitioner.” I will follow the majority’s example in this regard.
Unless otherwise stated, all statutory references are to the 1985 versions, which were in effect at the time of plaintiffs crimes.
In some circumstances, which do not apply in this case, the Board could decline to set a parole release date. ORS 144.120(4), (5).
So far as the record shows, plaintiff is not subject to an unexpired minimum term.
Contrary to the majority’s somewhat curious suggestion, the Board’s authority to revoke plaintiffs parole, if plaintiff had been released on his original release date, has nothing to do with the effect of an invalid extension of that date. Revocation requires some indication that the parolee violated a condition of parole, and the parolee has a right to a hearing on that issue. ORS 144.343. There is no basis for us to speculate that plaintiff, if he had been released as scheduled, would thereafter have violated his parole. At the very least, that possibility would not justify an otherwise illegal detention after the release date.
This statement of the facts is based on the record before us and would not limit what the trial court might find based on a more complete record on remand.
Since our decision in State v. Van Tassel, 5 Or App 376 , 484 P2d 1117 (1971), the Supreme Court has held that a challenge to an order of the PsychiatricSecurity *237 Review Board became moot when the Board released the petitioner unconditionally. The mere possibility that the petitioner might be required to repay the cost of care did not keep the case from being moot when there was no indication that the state intended to seek repayment. Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402 , 848 P2d 1194 (1993). Whatever effect the decision in Brumnett may have on the specific holding of Van Tassel , the Supreme Court’s discussion is consistent with the collateral consequences analysis that we described there.
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on this precise issue. In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 US 1 , 118 S Ct 978 , 140 L Ed 2d 43 (1998), it held that a challenge to a parole revocation became moot when the petitioner’s sentence expired while the habeas corpus petition was pending. Although the parole revocation thus had no collateral consequences, the Court’s discussion of the collateral consequences rule is consistent with the appellate cases that we describe. In a related area, the Court has held that a person who receives consecutive sentences remains “in custody” under 28 USC § 2254 on an expired conviction so long as the person is in custody on any of the consecutive sentences. Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 US 39 , 115 S Ct 1948 , 132 L Ed 2d 36 (1995).